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Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of
Appreciation Doctrine
Janneke Gerards*
Abstract: In this article it will be argued that good use of the instrument of deference
might help the EU courts to deal with the situation of pluralism that is currently visible in
the European legal order. By means of deferential judicial review, the EU courts can pay
due respect to national constitutional traditions and to national legislative and policy
choices, thus preventing situations of real conflict. In addition, deference enables the EU
courts to take into account the intricacies related to judicial review of norms drafted by
co-equal institutions or by national elected bodies. Although the EU courts already make
use of some form of deferential review, they may use the instrument in a clearer and more
structured manner. As a basis for the development of a European ‘doctrine of deference’,
a comparison will be made with the margin of appreciation doctrine devised by the
European Court of Human Rights. Although this doctrine is certainly not fault-free, it
offers a number of advantages in terms of clarity and controllability. If improved and
adapted on the basis of theoretical notions of procedural democracy, the doctrine might be
put to good use by the EU courts.
I Introduction
It has now become widely accepted that the EU cannot be regarded as a single,
hierarchical legal system in which there is complete supremacy of the legal rules created
by the EU institutions1 over national legislation and even over national constitutions.2
Instead, EU constitutional scholars have come to regard the EU as a complex, pluralist
legal order, in which there is close interaction and dialogue between the EU institutions
and the national authorities, but no clear hierarchical relationship.3 Indeed, the notion
* Professor of Constitutional and Administrative Law, University of Leiden, Institute for Public Law,
Section of Constitutional and Administrative Law.
1 The expression and prefix ‘EU’ will be used in this article, except for the situation in which specific
reference is made to the European Community (‘EC’ or ‘Community’). The term ‘EU courts’ is used to
indicate both the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance; now the General
Court.
2 This was different at the end of the 1990s; eg J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge
University Press, 1999) ch 9.
3 See, eg, N. MacCormick, ‘The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now’, (1995) 1 European Law Journal 259;
I. Maher, ‘Community Law in the National Legal Order: A Systems Analysis’, (1998) 36 Journal of
Common Market Studies 237; M. Kumm, ‘Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?: Three
Conceptions of the Relationship between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European
Court of Justice’, (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 351; N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional
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of pluralism provides an adequate description of the current relationship between the
legal orders within the EU.4 At the same time, the recognition of the pluralist character
of the European legal order evokes a multitude of practical and theoretical questions.
If there is no hierarchical relationship between legal norms, new ways have to be found
to solve conflicts between norms and to determine who is authorised to provide the final
interpretation of such norms. Some contend that a solution can only be found in the
recognition of one single principle or rule of priority.5 Others have submitted that a
presumption of supremacy of EU law should be accepted which can be rebutted by
overriding national constitutional concerns.6 And it has also been argued that prag-
matic solutions of dialogue may be sufficient to deal with any practical problems
arising.7
In this article, the theoretical debate on the need for one decisive principle to solve
conflicts between the European legal orders will be left aside. Instead, the focus will be
on one of the available practical remedies for the problems posed by constitutional
pluralism.8 It will be argued that good use of the instrument of ‘deference’, and more
specifically of variability of the intensity of judicial review, might help supranational
courts to avoid conflicts between norms arising from the different legal orders. By
means of deferential review, the EU courts can pay due respect to national constitu-
tional traditions and to national legislative and policy choices, thus preventing situa-
tions of real conflict. In addition, deference enables the EU courts to take into account
the intricacies related to judicial review of norms drafted by co-equal European insti-
tutions, or by national elected bodies. Although the European Court of Justice of the
European Union (ECJ) and the General Court already make use of some form of
deferential or marginal review, and although some variation in the intensity of their
review is already visible in European case-law, the EU courts might use the instrument
in a much more clear and refined manner.
Based on this premise, this article will make an argument for the development of a
consistent and structured ‘doctrine of deference’ to be used by the EU courts. To do so,
general doctrines of deference and variability of intensity of review will first be related
to the specific problematic constituted by judicial review in a pluralistic legal order
Pluralism’, (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317; M. Poiares Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s
Constitutional Pluralism in Action’, in N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition. Essays in European Law
(Hart, 2003), 501; M. Poiares Maduro, ‘Sovereignty in Europe: The European Court of Justice and the
Creation of a European Political Community’, in M.L. Volcansek and J.F. Stack Jr (eds), Courts Crossing
Borders. Blurring the Lines of Sovereignty (Carolina Academic Press, 2005), 43.
4 eg Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, ibid, at 337. Other explanatory terms and notions also
have some value, such as the notion of ‘multi-levelness’: F. Mayer, The European Constitution and the
Courts. Adjudicating European Constitutional Law in a Multilevel System, Jean Monnet Working Paper
9/03, at 36–37, available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/03/030901.html>, also mention-
ing a variety of other notions. However, the notion of pluralism will be used in this article since it is used
in legal scholarship most frequently.
5 eg W.T. Eijsbouts and L. Besselink, ‘Editorial: “The Law of Laws”—Overcoming Pluralism’, (2008) 4
European Constitutional Law Review, 395, at 397.
6 See, eg, Kumm, op cit n 3 supra, at 375–376, formulating a set of constitutional principles providing a
normative framework for the assessment of doctrines dealing with the relationship between the ECJ and
the national courts. See more elaborately M. Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict:
Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty’, (2005) 11 European Law
Journal 262, at 297–298.
7 cf MacCormick, op cit n 3 supra, at 265, stating that both national and EU courts should have regard to
the consequences and impact of their judgments on the other legal order.
8 There is clear need for such solutions; cf Eijsbouts and Besselink, op cit n 5 supra, at 396.
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(section II). In section III, an analysis of the case-law of the EU courts will be provided
in order to disclose the use these courts already make of the instrument of deference.
Subsequently, in section IV, the case-law of the EU courts will be contrasted with the
approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The ECtHR has
devised and applied its well-known margin of appreciation doctrine as an instrument to
negotiate between conflicting interests in a multi-layered legal order. Although the legal
framework created by the European Convention on Human Rights is very different
from that established by the European Union, the EU courts and the ECtHR experi-
ence partly overlapping problems related to pluralism.9 For that reason, the doctrine of
the margin of appreciation might provide an interesting example to the EU courts.10
Finally, in section V it will be argued that the use of a ‘margin of appreciation’-like
instrument might be of great value for the EU courts. If such a doctrine is put to good
use, and if account is taken of the difficulties the ECtHR has experienced in the
application of the doctrine, it might provide a valuable instrument to accommodate
some of the difficulties posed by the complex situation of constitutional pluralism.
II Pluralism, Judicial Review and the Need for Deference
A The Problem: Pluralism and the Position of the EU Courts
Generally, national courts, legislatures and governmental bodies appear to be quite
willing to cooperate with the EU courts.11 Many scholars have stressed that there are
hardly any problems of non-conformity with the ECJ’s and General Court’s judg-
ments.12 However, the high overall level of compliance notwithstanding, various
9 cf L.R. Helfer and A.M. Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’, (1997)
107 Yale Law Review 273, at 285; see also at 287–288.
10 cf D. Shelton, ‘The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe’, (2003) 13 Duke Journal of
Comparative and International Law 95, at 136, indicating that the approach of the ECJ is already similar
to that of the ECtHR. It is argued here, however, that express recognition of such a doctrine might
provide clarity and predictability in the ECJ’s case-law and might bolster good relations between national
courts and European courts.
11 cf M. Shapiro, ‘The European Court of Justice’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU
Law (Oxford University Press, 1999), 321, at 326. However, Mayer has shown that there are still
important national highest courts that do not or only rarely make preliminary references to the ECJ and
thus do not make effective use of the most important instrument for interaction and cooperation between
the European and the national court level: Mayer, op cit n 4 supra, at 4 ff. According to Mayer, this points
to the potential for disobedience (at 22).
12 cf Weiler, op cit n 2 supra, at 192 ff, and Helfer and Slaughter, op cit n 9 supra, at 292. See also B. De Witte,
‘Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), The
Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, 1999), 177, at 193. The fact that close cooperation with the
supranational bodies provides additional empowerment to national courts has often been noted to
stimulate their willingness to accept European judgments and interpretations: K. Alter, ‘Explaining
National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal
Integration’, in A.M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), The European Court and
National Courts—Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in its Social Context (Hart, 1998), 227, at 242;
W. Mattli and A.M. Slaughter, ‘The Role of National Courts in the Process of European Integration:
Accounting for Judicial Preferences and Constraints’, in Slaughter et al, ibid, 253, at 258; Weiler, op cit n
2 supra, at 197; Maduro, ‘Sovereignty in Europe, op cit n 3 supra, at 51–52. See also A. Stone Sweet, The
Judicial Construction of Europe (Oxford University Press, 2004), at 21; A.M. Slaughter, ‘Judicial Global-
ization’, (2000) 40 Virginia Journal of International Law 1107. Further explanations have been found in
the quality and persuasive force of the EU courts’ reasoning (cf Helfer and Slaughter, op cit n 9 supra, at
307 ff, in particular at 318), in the gradual and incremental way in which these courts have developed their
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national highest courts have indicated that they will not always be willing to follow the
lead of the EU courts.13 It appears that many, if not most, national (constitutional)
courts regard their own national constitutions as the foundation for EU law.14 In their
view, the supremacy of EU law does not so much directly follow from EU law as well
as from its voluntary acceptance by the national constitutional authorities.15 The
national constitutional courts usually accept the supremacy of EU law,16 but they only
do so on the condition that EU law does not violate fundamental constitutional
values.17 Highest national courts may decide to give precedence to their own national
constitutional norms and principles if they find that EU law does not offer sufficient
protection to fundamental rights or other constitutional norms that they consider of
primary importance and value, or if they find that the EU institutions have acted
severely ultra vires.18 Even though such national ‘disobedience’ of the norm of
supremacy of EU law may only rarely occur in practice, the shadow of its possibility is
always there.19
The resultant relationship between national and EU courts has often been called one
of judicial dialogue, meaning that national and EU courts respond to each other’s
pronouncements on a basis of mutual understanding and respect.20 It is obvious,
judicial powers (Shapiro, op cit n 11 supra, at 324; R.B. Ahdieh, ‘Between Dialogue and Decree:
International Review of National Courts’, (2004) 79 New York University Law Review 2045), in their
recognition of the need for cooperation and deference (A.M. Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’,
(2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 191, at 217), in the authority and neutrality of the European
judges, and in a number of contextual and functional factors such as the relative cultural and political
homogeneity of the polity, the economic nature of the European Communities and the empowerment by
EU law of individual legal actors (Helfer and Slaughter, op cit n 9 supra, at 300, 312 and 335; Shapiro,
op cit n 11 supra, at 328; Alter, ibid, at 238). To all probability it is the combination of all of these factors
that really explains the present level of cooperation and acceptance; see Stone Sweet, ibid, at 20 ff.
13 For an overview of relevant developments in both case-law and scholarship on the topic, see, eg, Weiler,
op cit n 2 supra, at 288; Mayer, op cit n 4 supra, at 10 ff. Most recently, the German Federal Constitutional
Court (Bundesverfassingsgericht) has stressed in its Lisbon judgment that the Member States remain the
masters of the treaties and that the ‘Constitution of Europe’ remains a derived fundamental order (para
231). As a result, the Federal Constitutional Court retains the power to exercise both ultra vires review
and identity review (ie the establishment of a violation of German constitutional identity, which may have
the effect that Community law or Union law is declared inapplicable in Germany) (para 241). See
Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvE 2/08, Judgment of 30 June 2009, available at http://www.bverfg.de/
entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html (English translation provided by the German Federal
Constitutional Court).
14 See, in particular, the Lisbon judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court, ibid, para 231.
15 De Witte, op cit n 12 supra, at 199 ff. The German Federal Constitutional Court has named this the
principle of openness towards European law (Europarechtsfreundlichkeit) (Lisbon judgment, ibid,
para 225). This means that, in fact, there is no hierarchy between amongst Community courts and that the
ECJ does not stand on top of a Community legal system; see J. Komárek, ‘Federal Elements in the
Community Judicial System: Building Coherence in the Community Legal Order’, (2005) 42 Common
Market Law Review 9, at 10.
16 D. Chalmers and A. Tomkins, European Union Public Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 201.
17 ibid, at 201. See also the aforementioned Lisbon judgment, n 13 supra.
18 Chalmers and Tomkins, ibid, at 204. See also De Witte, op cit n 12 supra, at 191 and 199 ff.
19 Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law’, op cit n 3 supra, at 521. See also Mayer, op cit n 4 supra, at 20; Stone
Sweet, op cit n 12 supra, at 91; Komárek, op cit n 15 supra, at 10.
20 eg V. Skouris, ‘The Position of the European Court of Justice in the EU Legal Order and its Relationship
with National Constitutional Courts’, (2005) Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 323, at 328; A.M. Slaugh-
ter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, (1994) 29 University of Richmond Law Review 99, at
112; Slaughter, ‘Judicial Globalization’, op cit n 12 supra, at 1108; Alter, op cit n 12 supra, at 232. For
definitions and characteristics of ‘judicial dialogue’, see Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’,
op cit n 12 supra, at 195 ff (referring in particular to ‘constitutional cross-fertilisation’ and ‘constitutional
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however, that the ‘dialogue’ between national and European courts is not really one
between ‘relative equals engaged in a common interpretative enterprise’.21 None of the
courts has the complete possibility to impose its will on the other, and each court will
always have to search for creative and innovative solutions that will be acceptable to
the other or that will persuade it to follow a set example.22 Thus, as convincingly
demonstrated by Ahdieh, each court can force the other to listen but not necessarily to
act.23 In Ahdieh’s view, the interaction between the courts therefore can better be
described in terms of judicial ‘dialectics’ than in terms of ‘dialogue’.24 Indeed, the
notion of ‘judicial dialectics’ seems to capture more adequately the highly particular
and dynamic distribution of power and interdependence between the national courts
and the EU courts.25
Acceptance of the existence of this situation of judicial dialectics may prevent the
occurrence of situations of real conflict between national and European courts. Effec-
tive dialectic review presupposes the existence and use of judicial instruments that can
be used to bolster the cooperation and voluntary acceptance of interpretations and
findings by both national and European courts.26 On the level of the EU, a well-known
vehicle for effective dialectic review is the preliminary rulings procedure of Article 234
EC.27 This procedure enables the national courts to ask the ECJ for clarification of
Community norms or, if need be, for invalidation. In formulating its reply, the ECJ can
take legal and constitutional circumstances into account that are not only relevant for
the EU, but also for the particular Member State that has raised the question. The ECJ
may even do so by deciding not to answer certain parts of a preliminary question so as
to leave the national authorities with sufficient discretion to design a solution that fits
well with its specific national situation. The ECJ thus invites national courts to add
their input to an interpretative partnership, which may not only enhance close collabo-
ration, but also increase the court’s legitimacy.28
The use of comparative methods of interpretation is another effective instrument of
judicial dialectics. The EU courts frequently use comparative analyses as a basis for
gap-filling and as a justification of novel interpretations of regulations or treaty
borrowing’ by national courts who build on each other’s opinions on basis of mutual respect) and Ahdieh,
op cit n 12 supra, at 2050 ff (describing judicial dialogue as a symbiotic relationship among judicial
institutions who actively and voluntarily engage and cooperate with each other).
21 L.R. Helfer, ‘Forum Shopping for Human Rights’, (1999) 148 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 285,
at 349.
22 Ahdieh, op cit n 12 supra, at 2068. See in the same vein Slaughter, op cit n 20 supra, at 125 and Komárek,
op cit n 15 supra, at 10.
23 Ahdieh, ibid, at 2035.
24 Ahdieh, ibid, at 2035 and 2088 ff.
25 Other terms have been conceived as well—De la Mare speaks, for example, of ‘discourse’ or ‘discursive
review’: T. de la Mare, ‘Article 177 in Social and Political Context’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), The
Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, 1999), 215, at 241. He reserves the term, however,
specifically for the preliminary rulings procedure. The notion of ‘dialectic review’ seems to have a broader
use, for which reason it will be used instead of alternative terms or notions.
26 Ahdieh, op cit n 12 supra, at 2074 and 2077; cf also Slaughter, op cit n 20 supra, at 124–125.
27 Alter, op cit n 12 supra, at 232; Weiler, op cit n 2 supra, at 193; see also A. Rosas, ‘The European Court
of Justice in Context: Forms and Patterns of Judicial Dialogue’, (2007) 1 European Journal of Legal
Studies 1, at 6–7; Ahdieh, op cit n 12 supra, at 2157 and de la Mare, op cit n 25 supra, at 241 ff.
28 For other reasons that explain the success of the preliminary rulings procedure as a dialectic mechanism,
see in particular Alter, ibid, at 242 and 249, explaining the important role of the procedure in the ‘power
play’ between higher and lower courts, a kind of competition that in itself bolsters the influence of the
ECJ’s judgments.
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provisions.29 By doing so, they implicitly indicate that they take the national legal
orders seriously.30 Although much criticism has been levelled at the use of the com-
parative method, it may be an important means to increase the persuasive or rhetorical
force of the EU courts’ judgments. In itself, such persuasive force is a vital element in
a system of dialectic review, especially if it helps to convince national courts of the
reasonableness and acceptability of the EU courts’ interpretations and decisions.31
Finally, the instrument of deference or marginal review may be used to negotiate
between potentially conflicting supranational and national interests.32 Deferential
review by the EU courts can be regarded as a sign of respect for the legitimacy of
national regulative and judicial proceedings and as a token of consideration for
national constitutional values and tradition. Hence, from the perspective of avoiding
conflicts between supranational and national courts, deference is an important and
interesting instrument. For that reason, the possibilities of this deferential review in a
pluralist legal order will be explored in more detail in the next section.
B Why Deference?
As stated in section IIA, deference can be used as an instrument by the EU courts to
avoid conflicts between the national and European legal orders. As long as national
authorities act within their ‘margin of discretion’, the European authorities can respect
their policy choices and their assessment of the need to take certain decisions. An
important basis for such deference may be found in an argument that the ECtHR has
aptly termed the ‘better placed’ argument.33 A supranational court that has to decide
about the appropriateness, necessity or reasonableness of national measures will often
not be in the right position to do so, since it does not sufficiently know or understand
the national circumstances or debates underlying the introduction of a certain measure
or policy. Domestic authorities are usually better equipped to make such assessments,
since they are likely to be more closely acquainted with national problems, (constitu-
tional) traditions, sensitivities and debates. In principle it is not desirable (or doable)
for the EU courts to second-guess the suitability or necessity of national decisions,
especially if such decisions have been taken in highly complex policy areas or if they
relate to sensitive issues that are prone to societal debate. Deference or marginal review
is an excellent instrument to leave these decisions to the national authorities and to
correct them only if they appear to be manifestly unreasonable or inappropriate.
29 cf J. Wouters, ‘National Constitutions and the European Union’, (2000) 27 Legal Issues of Economic
Integration 48. Legal scholars have often criticised the use both courts make of this method; see, eg, De
Witte, op cit n 12 supra, at 878. Nevertheless, it would appear that the rhetorical force of this instrument
is very strong and the European courts really seem to succeed in convincing national states by using it
(cf, eg, F. Ost, ‘The Original Canons of Interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights’, in
M. Delmas-Marty and Ch. Chodkiewicz (eds), The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), 283, at 312).
30 About the importance of this, see also Komárek, op cit n 15 supra, at 30.
31 See Slaughter, op cit n 20 supra, at 125. See, however, more critically, Alter, op cit n 12 supra, at 31, stating
that such persuasive force is indeed of some importance, yet it cannot wholly explain the acceptance of
ECJ doctrine. Indeed, it can be argued that persuasive force is only one of various elements explaining the
success of the existing dialectic relationship between the European courts and the national courts.
32 cf Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law’, op cit n 3 supra, at 534, stating that the increased discretion left to
national courts by the ECJ is of particular importance if applied in areas of possible conflict with national
constitutional law. Also see Ahdieh, op cit n 12 supra, at 2074.
33 See section IVCc.
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Deferential review also allows the EU courts to deal with a specific problem that is
often overlooked in the context of supranational law. This problem concerns the
typical position of any (constitutional) court in a legal system that is governed by the
rule of law. Courts are independent institutions that derive their legitimacy mainly from
the fact that they interpret and apply legal norms that have been adopted by demo-
cratically elected bodies. There is good reason to contend that the responsibility for
drafting legislation and policy making primarily should be placed by bodies specifically
designed and legitimised to do so. Important decisions should only be taken after a
transparent procedure in which all affected actors (stakeholders) can effectively par-
ticipate, in which alternative measures can be duly investigated and assessed, and in
which real (political) debate is possible over the balance to be struck between conflict-
ing interests.34 Even though some of these elements are clearly present in judicial
proceedings, a procedure before the courts cannot effectively substitute deliberative
government. For that reason, courts should not substitute their own views for those of
the legislature or a government agency too quickly.35
In a supranational legal system such as the EU, some debate is possible on the precise
importance of the latter argument. The democratic legitimacy of the European legis-
lative bodies is often questioned, for which reason some scholars have contended that
it may be not such a bad idea to entrust the EU courts with strong powers of review.36
However, an effective reply to this argument has been given by Ely, who has said that
‘ . . . we may grant until we’re blue in the fact that legislatures are not wholly demo-
cratic, but that isn’t going to make courts more democratic than legislatures’.37 In fact,
there is hardly a good reason of (democratic) legitimacy to let the EU courts have the
final say about policy decisions and political choices, rather than any other European
institution. In addition, it is important to recall that the EU courts also have to position
themselves in relation to national legislatures and government bodies, which evidently
do have strong (direct or indirect) democratic legitimacy.38 It is reasonable to expect
that the European courts take due account of the fact that many of the legislative rules
that they are presented with are the direct result of democratic deliberations, and of the
fact that many policy decisions are at least checked and controlled by elected bodies.
34 Whether such values as openness, transparency and participation of affected actors (stakeholders) should
preferably be protected and furthered in an architecture of ‘new governance’, ‘constitutionalism’, ‘rule of
law’ or ‘Rechtsstaat’, is of limited importance here (see for an overview G. de Búrca and J. Scott,
‘Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism’, in G. de Búrca and J. Scott (eds), Law and
New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart, 2006), 1, in particular at 2 ff). More relevant to the subject
of this article is the relationship between political actors and the courts. Even in a setting of ‘new
governance’, it is clear that the courts are less able than other actors to meet directly these important
values—their task is primarily to ‘police the borders’ and check whether such values have been sufficiently
guaranteed, not to substitute their own judgment for that of regulative or policy-making bodies
(cf J. Scott and S.P. Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial Role in New Governance,
Columbia Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group (Paper Number 07-146), at 9
and 12, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982281).
35 On the value of a doctrine of deference in this respect, see A.L. Young, ‘In Defence of Due Deference’,
(2009) 72 Modern Law Review 554, at 555. See however Scott and Sturm, ibid, at 5.
36 cf E.T. Swaine, ‘Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court of Justice’, (2000) 41
Harvard International Law Journal 1, at 63–64.
37 J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard University Press, 1980).
38 cf J.H. Jans et al, Europeanisation of Public Law (European Law Publishers, 2007), at 152. See also
J. Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European Convention on
Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), at 249, explaining that the same reasoning may have inspired the
ECtHR to develop its margin of appreciation doctrine.
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Deference seems to provide a proper instrument for dealing with this particular prob-
lematic as well.
To summarise, it can be recalled that supranational courts such as the EU courts find
themselves in a position that is even more complex than that of national (constitu-
tional) courts. They have to deal with national courts that will balk if they feel that their
national constitutional values are not taken sufficiently seriously. The EU courts have
to review decisions taken by co-equal institutions or by national legislatures that have
at least as much legitimacy to make political choices. And they have to take account of
their distance to the situation in the Member States and the related difficulty in
understanding and valuing national circumstances and considerations. To retain legiti-
macy and to stimulate voluntary compliance with their judgments and interpretations,
the EU courts will therefore have to make the best possible use of the instruments
available to enhance judicial dialectics. The instrument of deference, if put to good use,
answers to all of these problems. For that reason, the instrument will be analysed in
more detail in the next section.
C Systematising Deference—‘Levels of Intensity’
The notions of ‘deference’ and ‘marginal review’ are well known in national (adminis-
trative) law, both in civil law systems and in common law systems. In short, their
meaning is that a court that has to decide upon the appropriateness, necessity, reason-
ableness or justifiability of a certain measure or decision will not place itself in the
position of the administrative body or legislator who has originally drafted it. The court
will only superficially examine the case to see whether the decision-making process has
passed off well and whether the outcome of the decision-making process is not unrea-
sonable on face value. In national law, as well as in European law, a variety of
standards of review have been developed to express such deferential or marginal
review. Well known are such standards as ‘manifest unreasonableness’, ‘arbitrariness’,
‘clear excess of the bounds of discretion’ or ‘manifest error’.39 Although the precise
judicial test resulting from such formulaic standards is not always clear, the formulas
all clearly point in the direction of judicial restraint. The gist of deferential review is that
a court is competent to invalidate a measure only if any reasonable person could see
that it is not appropriate, reasonable, necessary or justifiable.
As explained in section IIB, notions of deference, marginal review and judicial
restraint provide interesting starting points for judicial review in a pluralist legal
system such as the EU. However, marginal review is not always desirable. In some
situations a ‘hard look’ approach40 or even rigorous judicial scrutiny may be called
for. Deference is based on the premise that procedures for decision making and regu-
lation are working faultlessly, that they are transparent, that they allow for effective
participation of stakeholders, and that they are capable of generating reasonable
outcomes (norms and decisions).41 Many decision-making procedures lack such quali-
ties or are at least deficient in one or more respects. If only deferential review is used
39 See, eg, T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2006), at 143.
40 This label has been developed in the USA; it indicates a slightly more intensive judicial scrutiny than real
marginal review (see Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co
463 US 29 (1983), at 43); see more elaborately P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press,
2006), at 476.
41 cf M. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton University Press 1999), at 31.
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and if only such standards as ‘manifest unreasonableness’ or ‘arbitrariness’ are
applied, unwanted procedural defects and flaws may not always be detected and
corrected.42 This is especially problematic if important interests, such as fundamental
rights, are at stake. In such cases, courts must operate as ‘gate-keepers’, checking
with reasonable care whether the demands of legitimacy, participation and account-
ability have been met.43
The argument that judicial restraint is not always appropriate and intensification
of review is sometimes needed is well accepted in constitutional doctrine.44 This
means that there should be some kind of variability as regards the intensity of judi-
cial review.45 Indeed, intensity of review is often thought of in terms of a ‘sliding
scale’, ranging from a very marginal deferential test to very strict or rigorous scru-
tiny.46 Within this range it may be possible to pinpoint ‘levels of intensity’, such as a
level of marginal review, a level of intermediate review, and a level of strict scrutiny.47
Such levels of intensity can have clear and unambiguous consequences for the stan-
dards to be applied by the courts in examining a certain measure or policy choice and
for the burden of proof.48 For example, if the ECJ would have to decide about the
suitability of a certain measure to further specific social aims, marginal review might
imply that the individual applicant has to adduce clear and uncontested evidence to
show that the measure will not and cannot have the desired effects, and that the
ineffectiveness of the measure could readily have been foreseen by the legislator or
government body.49 Were a level of strict scrutiny to be chosen, different standards
might apply. The burden of persuasion might then be placed with the responsible
government body, which would have to demonstrate the adequacy of the measure as
a means to obtain a certain goal by adducing conclusive evidence and by pointing out
that the effectiveness of the instrument has been duly investigated in preparing the
decision or regulation. The court may even require that, where a choice between
different means existed for the government body, it should demonstrate that it has
chosen the least restrictive means.50 In addition, in applying strict scrutiny, the EU
courts might use an ex nunc test, examining whether the practical application of the
measure or decision really demonstrates its effectiveness, rather than ex tunc review,
examining whether the decision-making bodies could expect the measure to be effec-
tive. Finally, strict scrutiny might imply that procedural guarantees and remedies are
42 J.H. Gerards, Judicial Review in Equal Treatment Cases (Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), at 80.
43 cf Scott and Sturm, op cit n 34 supra, at 2 and 6.
44 See, with references, Gerards, op cit n 42 supra, at 80.
45 cf Craig, op cit n 40 supra, at 657.
46 cf J.H. Gerards, ‘Intensity of Judicial Review in Equal Treatment Cases’, (2004) 51 Netherlands Interna-
tional Law Review 135, at 140 and, critically, J.C. Rutten, ‘Elasticity in Constitutional Standards of
Review: Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena and Continuing Uncertainty in the Supreme Court’s Equal
Protection Jurisprudence’, (1997) 70 Southern California Law Review 591, at 634.
47 Indeed, it is valuable to do so, since the ‘sliding scale’ model does not offer much in terms of clarity and
predictability—see Rutten, op cit n 46 supra, at 634. See also J. Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable
Intensity of Review’, (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 174, at 203, distinguishing between a large, a
moderate and a small degree of restraint.
48 See Gerards, op cit n 42 supra, at 82 and 675 ff, developing a variety of standards of review to be used in
equal treatment cases; Craig, op cit n 40 supra, at 468 ff, analysing the standards applied by the ECJ and
the Court of First Instance.
49 cf J. Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law. A Study of the Relationship Between the Freedoms (Oxford
University Press 2002), at 174.
50 cf Tridimas, op cit n 39 supra, at 212.
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required to offer the affected person or organisation the opportunity to complain
about a violation of their rights and interests.51
Distinguishing such ‘levels’ of intensity and defining clear standards of proof and
judicial review that correspond to these levels is highly valuable from the perspective of
predictability and transparency of judicial review.52 National bodies and individuals
will know what to expect in terms of burden of proof and standards of review if a
certain measure or decision is taken. Furthermore, if national authorities know that the
supranational courts’ scrutiny is more intensive in particular situations, they may pay
more attention to the quality of the decision-making process and to the reasonableness
of the outcome. The responsibility for sound legislation and decision making is then
placed where it belongs—with the legislature and the administrative authorities.
However, even though systematic use of levels of intensity may be considered to be
desirable, it is difficult to achieve. To show the need for improvement of the EU courts’
case-law on this point, the next section will provide an analysis of the way in which the
EU courts determine the intensity of their review in cases in which the principle of
proportionality is applied. This analysis is followed by a similar analysis of the case-law
of the ECtHR, which will serve both as a contrast and as a source of inspiration for
improvement.
III Intensity of Review in the EU Courts’ Application of the Principle
of Proportionality
A Introduction
The principle of proportionality constitutes a core principle for EU law.53 It is often
invoked before the EU courts, both in cases concerning EU regulation or policy and
in cases about national norms or decisions.54 Proportionality review is generally con-
sidered to demand the application of three subtests, namely the tests of suitability,
necessity and proportionality stricto sensu (ie the test of the reasonableness of the
balance struck between the various interests concerned).55 All of these tests clearly
demand an assessment to be made of policy considerations and political choices. The
need for such assessment is sometimes said to make the principle rather ill-suited for
judicial review.56 It is difficult for judges, after all, to value the balance struck by
51 ibid, at 194.
52 cf Craig, op cit n 40 supra, at 471–472.
53 cf J. Schwarze, European Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell, rev 1st edn, 2006), at 677 and 718–726,
considering that there are reasons to state that, in the area of European law, the principle has constitu-
tional status or even the status of a fundamental right. See also Tridimas, op cit n 39 supra, at 136–137 and
Jans et al, op cit n 38 supra, at 146.
54 cf Tridimas, op cit n 39 supra, at 137. See also Schwarze, ibid, at 681 and G. de Búrca, ‘The Principle of
Proportionality and its Application in EC Law’, (1993) Yearbook of European Law 105, at 114–115.
55 See generally O. Koch, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismaßigkeit in der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der
Europäische Gemeinschaften (Duncker & Humblot, 2003); F.G. Jacobs, ‘Recent Developments in the
Principle of Proportionality in European Community Law’, in E. Ellis (ed), The Principle of Proportion-
ality in the Laws of Europe (Hart, 1999), 1; de Búrca, op cit n 54 supra, at 112–113; Jans et al, op cit n 38
supra, at 148–149. Importantly, however, although all of the three sub-tests are recognised and used in
European law, the ECJ appears to be rather ambiguous as regards their application. See, more elabo-
rately, Koch, ibid, at 199 ff; see also Jans et al, op cit n 38 supra, at 148 and Tridimas, op cit n 39 supra,
at 139 (arguing that really only two subtests are applied).
56 cf, eg, J.M. O’Fallon, ‘Adjudication and Contested Concepts: The Case of Equal Protection’, (1979) 54
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policy-making bodies, or to gather sufficient factual information to be able to con-
clude that the goals of a measure could have been attained equally well by less intru-
sive means.57 It is not surprising, therefore, that deferential review is often considered
appropriate in cases in which the principle of proportionality has been invoked.58
Nevertheless, there are also occasions in which the ‘soft touch’ approach is replaced
by very strict scrutiny, especially cases concerning interference with fundamental
rights.59
As a result, the European proportionality case-law constitutes a good object of
analysis of the factors determining the intensity of the EU courts’ review.60 To illustrate
the use of different levels of intensity in European proportionality review, this section
will offer the results of an analysis that has been made of the way in which the EU
courts have expressed themselves on the applicable level of intensity and on the factors
determining their choice for a certain intensity of review. The analysis pertains to
judgments of the ECJ and the General Court from January 2004 until May 2009 in
which a plea regarding the principle of proportionality has been expressly addressed by
the courts.61 Decisions relating to penalties or other financial burdens have not been
analysed, since the proportionality test then has a different character.62 Thus, the
analysis only dealt with cases in which proportionality has been invoked as a general
principle for legislative or discretionary policy choices, either by national authorities
(eg in the context of free movement of goods, provision of services, protection of
fundamental rights, citizenship) or Community institutions (eg in the area of agricul-
ture).
As a preliminary to the analysis provided in this section, it must be stressed that
determination of the level of intensity of review does not appear to be an issue that
the European courts play much express attention to.63 The EU courts’ variation of
the intensity of review seems to have grown naturally and incrementally, rather than
having been consciously introduced as a well-considered and useful judicial instru-
ment. There is no sign of any clear judicial doctrine that explains the use of the levels
of review and their consequences, nor are there any cases in which the ECJ has laid
down a clear list of intensity determining factors. The ECJ does not even seem to
distinguish expressly between different levels of intensity, although it evidently makes
New York University Law Review 19, at 43 and T.A. Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing’, (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 943, at 973–974. See more specifically for the EU courts, de Búrca,
ibid, at 107.
57 cf de Búrca, ibid, at 108–109; J.H. Jans, ‘Proportionality Revisited’, (2000) 27 Legal Issues of European
Integration 248; J. Snell, ‘True Proportionality and Free Movement of Goods and Services’, (2000)
European Business Law Review 48, at 50–51; B. Schueler, ‘Methods of Application of the Proportionality
Principle in Environmental Law’, (2008) 35 Legal Issues of European Integration 231, at 233–234.
58 See, in particular, Snell, ibid, at 51.
59 See section IIIBd.
60 This is a well-known and carefully researched premise. For some important case-law analyses underlying
this premise, see, eg, de Búrca, op cit n 54 supra, at 111 ff; Gerards, op cit n 42 supra, at 307 ff; Craig, op
cit n 40 supra, at 704 ff; Tridimas, op cit n 39 supra, at 138 ff.
61 The case-law analysis has been supplemented by a study of cases which are often mentioned in scholarly
literature on the principle of proportionality or on intensity of judicial review; in particular Craig, op cit
n 40 supra; Schwarze, op cit n 53 supra; Tridimas, op cit n 39 supra; Gerards, op cit n 42 supra (in the
context of non-discrimination).
62 It is then rather a test of excessiveness; cf Schwarze, ibid, at 861.
63 cf Craig, op cit n 40 supra, at 472.
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a difference between (very) marginal and (very) strict review.64 This means that levels
of review and intensity-determining factors had to be traced by looking closely for
correspondence between certain factual or legal circumstances and the use of certain
standards of review. As a result, the factors discussed in the remainder of this section
are based on interpretation of the EU courts’ case-law, rather than on clear expres-
sions and statements by the EU courts about their relevance and meaning. However,
even if, as a consequence, some of the classifications of the courts’ case-law may be
controversial, at least they may provide an indication and a basis for further analysis
and debate.
B Factors Determining the Intensity of the EU Courts’ Review
a) Nature of the Interests Impaired; Seriousness and Nature of
the Interference
The nature of the interests harmed by the relevant measure or decision is one first
important factor in determining the appropriate level of review. If a central Community
interest has been impaired, such as free movement rights or the possibilities for inter-
state trade, the European courts will usually apply their strictest level of review.65 This
is especially true for cases brought by the European Commission against a Member
State for non-compliance with Community rules.66 Measures or decisions that impede
the attainment of the overall aims of the EU are a priori considered unacceptable and
undesirable by the courts and are generally assessed critically for their reasonableness
and appropriateness. The EU courts in these cases demand ‘overriding interests’67 or
‘imperative reasons relating to the public interest’68 to be advanced in justification of
such a measure or decision. They will assess the arguments presented by the national
authorities in defence of the measure in great detail and they demand precise and
convincing evidence to be advanced to establish the necessity of the derogating
64 In particular Gerards, op cit n 46 supra; Gerards, op cit n 42 supra, at 357 ff; Craig, op cit n 40 supra, at
472, 477 and 479.
65 Craig, ibid, at 704.
66 cf ibid, at 704; Wouters, op cit n 29 supra, at 56; Tridimas, op cit n 39 supra, at 193. See, eg, Case C-36/02,
Omega Spielhallen [2004] ECR I-9609; Case C-24/00, Commission v France (vitamins and caffeine) [2004]
ECR I-1277; Case C-387/99, Commission v Germany (vitamin preparations) [2004] ECR I-3751; Case
C-463/01, Commission v Germany (German bottles) [2004] ECR I-11705; Case C-41/02, Commission v
Netherlands (vitamins and minerals) [2004] ECR I-11375; Case C-319/05, Commission v Germany (garlic
capsules) [2007] ECR I-9811; Case C-444/05, Stamatelaki [2007] ECR I-3185; Case C-297/05, Commission
v Netherlands (identification and roadworthiness of vehicles) [2007] ECR I-7467; Case C-161/07, Commis-
sion v Austria (work permit exception certificates for self-employed) (unreported); Case C-265/06, Com-
mission v Portugal (tinted film on car windows) [2008] ECR I-2245; Case C-88/07, Commission v Spain
(medicinal herb products) (unreported); Case C-169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft (unreported).
67 eg Case C-444/05, Stamatelaki [2007] ECR I-3185; Case C-297/05, Commission v Netherlands (identifi-
cation and roadworthiness of vehicles) [2007] ECR I-7467; Case C-438/05, Viking Line [2007] ECR I-10779;
Case C-341/05, Laval [2007] ECR I-11767; Case C-265/06, Commission v Portugal (tinted film on car
windows) [2008] ECR I-2245; Case C-88/07, Commission v Spain (medicinal herb products) (unreported);
Case C-169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft (unreported).
68 eg Case C-76/90, Säger [1991] ECR 4221; Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen [2004] ECR I-9609; Case
C-463/01, Commission v Germany (German bottles) [2004] ECR I-11705.
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measure.69 In addition, the EU courts in these cases often mention the (hypothetical)
availability of less intrusive means that might have been chosen as an alternative to the
contested measure.70
However, this particular factor is not always of prevailing importance in determining
the courts’ intensity of review. If Community interests are affected by a measure
adopted by one of the Community institutions, the courts do not always appear to
apply intensive review.71 This can be explained by the presence of other important
intensity-determining factors, such as the general discretion the Community legislature
has in regulating complex economic policy areas. This factor will be discussed in section
IIIBc below.
In addition, the degree of interference with Community interests may be of impor-
tance to the intensity of the courts’ review. It is obvious that the courts will apply their
strictest scrutiny to clear expressions of national protectionism and overt forms of
discrimination.72 A classic example is the case about the German Rheinheitsgebot, in
which the ECJ applied a very strict test because the national restrictions at stake were
particularly far-reaching.73 Another notorious case is the British poultry case, in which
the ECJ suspected that limitations on the import of poultry were not so much intro-
duced to combat animal disease (as had been pleaded by the British government), but
to prevent the import of French turkey for the Christmas market (which threatened the
British production).74 In this case too, the ECJ was extremely strict in its review of the
justification advanced by the government.
In line with this case-law the ECJ also seems to demand a stronger justification if a
restriction of free trade is particularly serious, as in the situation in which an absolute
prohibition is contested or a system of prior authorisation or licensing is maintained.75
In those cases, the ECJ will usually not accept that there were no other, less restrictive
means available to achieve the aims pursued.76 On the other hand, in cases in which
69 eg Case C-319/05, Commission v Germany (garlic capsules) [2007] ECR I-9811; Case C-161/07, Commis-
sion v Austria (work permit exception certificates for self-employed) (unreported); Case C-88/07, Commis-
sion v Spain (medicinal herb products) (unreported).
70 eg Case C-387/99, Commission v Germany (vitamin preparations) [2004] ECR I-3751; Case C-444/05,
Stamatelaki [2007] ECR I-3185; Case C-161/07, Commission v Austria (work permit exception certificates
for self-employed) (unreported); Case C-297/05, Commission v Netherlands (identification and roadwor-
thiness of vehicles) [2007] ECR I-7467; Case C-319/05, Commission v Germany (garlic capsules) [2007]
ECR I-9811; Case C-265/06, Commission v Portugal (tinted film on car windows) [2008] ECR I-2245.
71 eg Joined Cases C-184/02 and C-223/02, Spain and Finland v European Parliament and Council (self-
employed drivers) [2004] ECR I-7789, in which the court mentioned that the measure harmed freedoms
central to Community law, such as the freedom to pursue an occupation and the freedom to conduct a
business (para 51), but the measure was taken in the area of the common transport policy, in which the
Community legislature enjoys wide discretion (para 56).
72 cf Jans, op cit n 57 supra, at 253; Craig, op cit n 40 supra, at 706.
73 Case 178/84, Commission v Germany (Rheinheitsgebot) [1987] ECR 1227, para 47.
74 Case 40/82, Commission v UK (Poultry) [1982] ECR 2793, in particular paras 40 and 41; see also the
opinion of AG Capotorti at 2845 and cf de Búrca, op cit n 54 supra, at 131–132. See also Sir Gordon
Slynn, ‘The Concept of the Free Movement of Goods and the Reservation for National Action under
Article 36 EEC Treaty’, in J. Schwarze (ed), Discretionary Powers of the Member States in the Field of
Economic Policies and their Limits under the EEC Treaty (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987), 17, at 21; de
Búrca, ibid, at 139; Wouters, op cit n 29 supra, at 56.
75 eg Case C-444/05, Stamatelaki [2007] ECR I-3185 (absolute exclusion of reimbursement of the cost of
treatment provided in a private hospital in another Member State); Case C-319/05, Commission v
Germany (garlic capsules) [2007] ECR I-9811, para 89; Case C-88/07, Commission v Spain (medicinal herb
products) (unreported), para 91.
76 Case C-444/05, Stamatelaki [2007] ECR I-3185, para 35.
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there is no particularly serious interference with a European interest, less intensive
scrutiny is sometimes applied, especially if the choice for restraint is supported by other
intensity-reducing factors.77
Finally, if no (central) Community interest is at stake, but the contested measure or
decision only affects national or individual interests (not being a fundamental right),78
the EU courts usually leave the authorities with more leeway to decide.79 This is visible
especially when the aim or effect of the measure is to further Community interests,
rather than to harm them. This is disclosed, for example, by the case-law regarding
implementation of Community policies, such as the common agricultural policy or the
policies on public health (in particular food additives), transport, road safety or animal
welfare.80 It does not appear to be of any real significance here whether the measure or
decision has been adopted by a national body or a Community institution—if an
implementation measure furthering Community interests has been adopted by the
national legislature, the Community courts will rely on the deferential test as much as
when the measure would have been introduced by the European Commission.81
It is thus clear that the nature of the aims and interests pursued and protected and the
seriousness of the interference play an important role in the determination of the proper
level of review by the EU courts.82 At first glance the use of this factor may not seem to
fit in well with the general reasons for variation in the intensity of review as expounded
in section II of this paper. It has been explained there that, in theory, intensification of
judicial review can be considered acceptable if there is objective reason to suppose that
the decision-making process shows important defects which should be repaired by the
judiciary. For the European courts, however, this does not seem to be the main reason
to opt for a heightened level of review. The primary reason for variation in the level of
review seems to be substantive in nature (ie related to the attainment of the EU’s main
goals), rather than procedural (ie related to flaws in the underlying decision-making
processes).83 However, in the particular European context it is quite understandable
that the factor concerning the importance of the protected interests and the nature of
the interference is used in this manner. The central objectives of the EC Treaty have
always played a pivotal role in the EU courts’ interpretation and application of Com-
munity law. In building the European legal order, it has been essential for the courts to
77 See, eg, Joined Cases C-1/90 and C-176/90, Aragonesa [1990] ECR I-4151, in which the court held, with
respect to a Spanish prohibition on advertisements for drinks with an alcohol content higher than 23%:
‘A national measure such as that at issue restricts freedom of trade only to a limited extent since it
concerns only beverages having an alcoholic strength of more than 23 degrees. In principle, the latter
criterion does not appear to be manifestly unreasonable as part of a campaign against alcoholism’ (para
17). In this case, the lack of a serious interference was combined with the lack of consensus on the
prevention of alcoholism (see section IIIBb). See also Gerards, op cit n 42 supra, at 339.
78 See section IIIBd.
79 eg Case C-499/06, Nerkowska [2008] ECR I-3993.
80 eg Case T-19/01, Chiquita Brands International [2005] ECR II-315; Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04,
Alliance for Natural Health [2005] ECR I-6451; Joined Cases C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04,
ABNA [2005] ECR I-10423; Case C-504/04, Agrarproduktion Staebelow (unreported), Case C-326/05P,
Industrias Quínicas del Vallés (unreported), Case C-375/05, Geuting [2007] ECR I-7983; Case C-491/06,
Danske Svineproducenter [2008] ECR I-3339; Case C-448/06, cp-Pharma (unreported), Case T-75/06,
Bayer Crop-Science et al (unreported).
81 For cases in which national measures were at stake, see, eg, Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, Alliance
for Natural Health [2005] ECR I-6451; Case C-491/06, Danske Svineproducenter [2008] ECR I-3339.
82 See also de Búrca, op cit n 54 supra, at 148 and Tridimas, op cit n 39 supra, at 193.
83 cf Craig, op cit n 40 supra, at 704.
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‘punish’ both national and institutional behaviour that is contrary to the central aims
of the EC Treaty, whilst encouraging decisions and measures furthering such objec-
tives. Since the aims and objectives of the EC Treaty are relatively clear and even have
been laid down in the text of the Treaty, this factor is easy to use as a basis for variation
in intensity of review.84
b) Contra-Indication—Nature of the Protected Interests
i) Objectives on which there is no European Consensus
The EU courts highly value the aims that are central to the EU treaties, which means
that they usually strictly scrutinise Community and national measures that would seem
to hamper the realisation of these aims. There is, however, an important contra-
indication to this. The EU courts will apply a more deferential test (though not a really
marginal one) if the contested measure or decision is meant to further an interest on
which there is no consensus within the EU.85 This contra-indication is present, for
example, if a national measure aims to protect public order or public policy, as in the
German case of Omega Spielhallen.86 This case concerned a Germany prohibition on
laser games, which had as a consequence that an English company could not sell a
franchise to a German company that planned to run a ‘laserdrome’. On basis of the
case-law discussed above, one would expect the ECJ to apply strict scrutiny in this case,
since the impossibility to sell the franchise interfered with the fundamental Community
freedom to provide services. Indeed, the court referred to the usual formula that
‘ . . . the concept of “public policy” in the Community context, particularly as justifi-
cation for a derogation from the fundamental principle of the freedom to provide
services, must be interpreted strictly’, and it stressed that ‘public policy may be relied on
only if there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of
society’.87 However, it then stressed that ‘the specific circumstances which may justify
recourse to the concept of public policy may vary from one country to another and
from one era to another’, and it held that ‘[t]he competent national authorities must
therefore be allowed a margin of discretion within the limits imposed by the Treaty’.88
The ECJ also underlined that conceptions on the precise way to protect a fundamental
right, such as the right to human dignity, may differ between the various member states.
The necessity of a certain measure could therefore not be assessed by establishing that
the German prohibition on laser games was not shared by many other states: ‘ . . . the
need for, and proportionality of, the provisions adopted are not excluded merely
84 However, sometimes this is not really helpful for the court. See, eg, Case C-438/05, Viking Line [2007]
ECR I-10779 and C-341/05, Laval [2007] ECR I-11767, in which the ECJ found on basis of the EC Treaty
that the Community not only has an economic interest but also a social purpose, which meant that the
provisions of the EC Treaty on free movement of goods, persons, services and capital must be balanced
against the objectives pursued by social policy (Laval, paras 104–105; Viking Line, paras 78–79). This case
thus disclosed a conflict between the aims of the treaty and did not provide any clue as to the proper level
of intensity to be applied. In the end, the ECJ did not pay express attention to the question of intensity
of review at all, probably because of the difficulties in harmonising the conflicting intensity determining
factors.
85 See de Búrca, op cit n 54 supra, at 128; Snell, op cit n 49 supra, at 215; Craig, op cit n 40 supra, at 708.
86 Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen [2004] ECR I-9609. See also, eg, Case 41/74, Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337,
para 18 and Joined Cases C-65/95 and C-111/95, Shingara and Radiom [1997] ECR I-3343, para 30.
87 Para 30.
88 Para 31.
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because one Member State has chosen a system of protection different from that
adopted by another State’.89 The national authorities thus did not have to demonstrate
that the prohibition was really ‘indispensable’ as a means to protect human dignity and
public order. In addition, the ECJ did not pay express attention to the question whether
the prohibition was effective as a means to protect human dignity and whether it met
the general requirement of proportionality. All of these assessments were left to be
made by the national authorities, which the ECJ considered to be better placed to
estimate which measures were really needed to meet the essentially national standards
of protection of human dignity. Thus, the review applied by the ECJ can rightly be
considered to be deferential.
Similar examples of restraint can be found in cases in which sensitive fundamental
rights or socially contested national issues and values are at stake, as in cases about the
necessity of restricting gambling and lotteries,90 the prevention of alcohol abuse,91
protection of public morality,92 national security,93 protection of the rights of the
child,94 and sometimes even protection of public health95 and road safety.96 In many of
these cases, the deference shown by the EU courts is witnessed by the fact that they do
not a priori reject intrusive measures such as licensing systems, which they normally
regard as serious interferences warranting intensive scrutiny (see section IIIBa).97 In
addition, the courts show themselves quite critical about the existence and effectiveness
of possible alternative and less intrusive measures.98 Even the government’s obligation
to show the appropriateness and necessity of a certain measure proves to be less
difficult to bear in these cases.99 Finally, in a large number of preliminary rulings
concerning measures with objectives on which there is no European consensus, the ECJ
89 Para 38.
90 eg Case C-275/92, Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039, in which the ECJ held that national authorities need to
have a sufficient degree of latitude to determine what is required ‘ . . . in the light of the specific social and
cultural features of each Member State, to maintain order in society, as regards the manner in which
lotteries are operated, the size of the stakes, and the allocation of the profits they yield’ (para 61); see also,
more elaborately, Case C-124/97, Läärä [1999] ECR I-6067, paras 36–39 and Joined Cases C-338/04,
C-359/04 and C-360/04, Placania [2007] ECR I-1891, para 46.
91 eg Case C-434/04, Ahokainen and Leppik [2006] ECR I-9171, paras 32–33, concerning the prevention of
alcohol abuse. Cf also Craig, op cit n 40 supra, at 709.
92 eg Case 34/79, Henn and Darby [1979] ECR 3795, para 15 and Case 121/85, Conegate [1986] ECR 1007,
para 14.
93 eg Case C-285/98, Kreil [2000] ECR I-69, para 24; see also Case C-83/94, Leifer [1995] ECR I-3231 and
Case C-70/94, Werner [1995] ECR I-3189. See further Gerards, op cit n 42 supra, at 310 ff and 337 ff.
94 Case C-244/06, Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH (unreported), para 44.
95 Case C-141/07, Commissio Germany (supply of medicinal products) (unreported), para 51.
96 Case C-110/05, Commission v Italy (motorcycle trailers) (unreported), para 65. For overviews of the older
case-law from which this trend appears, see in particular de Búrca, op cit n 54 supra, at 128 ff.
97 Joined Cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04, Placania [2007] ECR I-1891.
98 eg Case C-141/07, Commission v Germany (supply of medicinal products) (unreported), para 58 (‘ . . . the
approach upheld by the Commission [the alternative measure, JHG] . . . is likely to undermine the unity
and balance of the system for the supply of medicinal products to hospitals in Germany and, conse-
quently, the high level of public health protection which the Federal Republic of Germany seeks to
achieve’).
99 ibid, para 66 (‘ . . . whilst it is true that it is for a Member State which invokes an imperative requirement
as justification for the hindrance to free movement of goods to demonstrate that its rules are appropriate
and necessary to attain the legitimate objective being pursued, that burden of proof cannot be so extensive
as to require the Member State to prove, positively, that no other conceivable measure could enable that
objective to be attained under the same conditions’).
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leaves it to the national court to decide on the necessity and appropriateness of a
particular national measure to achieve the aims pursued.100
It may be derived from the analysed case-law that a clear lack of European consensus
on important fundamental rights or on essential social values may trump the all-
important rule that strict scrutiny is applied to measures harming inter-state trade or
other vital European interests. It must be stressed, however, that the courts do not
consistently appear to apply this factor. For example, as Wouters has shown, the ECJ
has sometimes regarded national linguistic policy as closely related to national identity
and culture.101 In the Groener case, the ECJ implicitly seemed to allow Ireland signifi-
cant latitude to support and promote the Irish language by means of the requirement
for each tenured teacher at a public institution to have knowledge of Irish.102 By
contrast, in a number of cases relating to language requirements in Belgium, the ECJ
showed far less deference.103 Similar inconsistencies can be observed in the ECJ’s
case-law regarding national security.104 It may therefore be concluded that the factor of
national consensus can be of relevance to the determination of the EU courts’ intensity
of review, but it is not entirely clear to what extent it influences the intensity of its
review, nor how it inter-relates with other intensity-determining factors.
ii) Objectives on which there is no Scientific Consensus
The ECJ has also sometimes stressed the latitude of the national authorities to assess
the necessity and proportionality of certain measures because of a lack of scientific
consensus.105 An increasing number of cases concern limitations on trade in food stuffs
(eg food with added vitamins or minerals) or measures aimed at the protection of the
environment. In one of these cases (Commission v Denmark), the ECJ held that:
. . . discretion relating to the protection of public health is particularly wide where it is shown that
uncertainties continue to exist in the current state of scientific research as to certain substances, such as
vitamins, which are not as a general rule harmful in themselves but may have special harmful effects
solely if taken to excess as part of the general nutrition, the composition of which cannot be foreseen or
monitored.106
The national authorities are thus left with some leeway because of the lack of scientific
consensus on the objectives pursued and the suitability and necessity of certain mea-
sures to attain such objectives. However, in the very same case of Commission v
Denmark the court has also formulated detailed standards to be met by the state as
regards the proof of necessity and the required level of detail of the risk assessments
underlying the relevant measures and decisions.107 This means that the court in fact left
100 eg Joined Cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04, Placania [2007] ECR I-1891, para 58; Case C-244/06,
Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH [2008] ECR I-505, para 52.
101 Wouters, op cit n 29 supra, at 52 ff.
102 Case C-379/89, Groener [1989] ECR 3967.
103 Case C-369/89, Piageme I [1991] ECR I-2971 and Case C-85/94, Piageme II [1995] ECR I-2955; for a
discussion of these cases, see Wouters, op cit n 29 supra, at 52.
104 As mentioned above, the ECJ generally offers the states some discretion in deciding about the need for
measures to protect national security, but sometimes no particularly marginal assessment can be seen in
such cases (eg Case C-367/89, Richardt [1991] ECR 4621); see further de Búrca, op cit n 54 supra, at
134–135 and Gerards, op cit n 42 supra, at 338, n 462.
105 cf Craig, op cit n 40 supra, at 706.
106 Case C-192/01, Commission v Denmark [2003] ECR I-9693, para 43. See also Case C-41/02, Commission
v Netherlands (vitamins and minerals) [2004] ECR I-11375.
107 Paras 45–47. See also eg Case C-41/02, Commission v Netherlands (vitamins and minerals) [2004] ECR
I-11375, paras 47–54.
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far less discretion than in cases such as Omega.108 An explanation for this might be
found in the fact that the difficulty in deciding about the reasonableness of a limitation
in cases about the precautionary principle is not so much the absence of ‘moral’
consensus between the Member States, as well as the lack of scientific agreement on the
risks to public health or the environment. In assessing such risks, the ECJ does not find
itself in a position that is very different from that of the national courts.109 This is
different in cases where there is a lack of consensus about the importance of a certain
right or fundamental interest, since the national authorities may really be in a better
position to value the need for protection of such interests than the European courts are.
Nevertheless, this does not provide a completely satisfactory explanation. The argu-
ment of scientific controversy is sometimes used by the court in cases about Community
measures as a reason to show deference towards the Community institutions.110 Most
probably, the argument for deference is then not only supported by a lack of (scientific)
consensus, but also by other factors in favour of marginal review, such as the existence
of widely formulated legislative powers.111
c) Discretionary Powers
Another factor that is predictive for the intensity of the EU courts’ review is the scope
of the competences and powers of the relevant government institutions.112 This factor is
of particular relevance with regard to measures or decision taken by the Community
institutions.113 The Community institutions generally have wide discretionary powers
as regards legislation.114 In the field of administrative application of regulatory norms,
the degree and nature of discretion is variable. Sometimes such discretion merely
concerns the factual assessment that is needed to decide whether the conditions for
application of a specific regulation are met.115 In other cases, discretionary powers
stretch to deciding whether or not a certain action will really be taken—a situation
which Craig has termed ‘classical discretion’.116 Finally, as Craig has explained, even if
the regulation does not contain any express or meaningful discretion, some measure of
discretion may exist if the regulation is cast in general terms and requires interpretation
to be applied in a concrete case.117
108 cf Craig, op cit n 40 supra, at 706; Tridimas, op cit n 39 supra, at 225.
109 Gerards, op cit n 42 supra, at 335. See, however, Lord Slynn, who has correctly argued that even here the
‘better placed’ argument may be of some value, since the national authorities can usually better judge
the national eating habits and the need to prohibit certain additives to prevent people from exceeding the
maximum amounts (op cit n 74 supra, at 22).
110 eg Case C-448/06, cp-Pharma (unreported), para 28, in which the court stated that discretion was all the
more justified with regard to a file which ‘ . . . is particularly complex since it raises questions which are
delicate and controversial from a scientific viewpoint’, and pointed at the ongoing scientific uncertainty
and divergent scientific opinions on the topic. Different from the cases about the precautionary principle,
however, the court in this case really relied on the findings of the European Commission and did not
exercise any kind of rigorous scrutiny.
111 See section IIIBc.
112 cf de Búrca, op cit n 54 supra, at 118.
113 cf Craig, op cit n 40 supra, at 668–669.
114 Although it must be remarked that the discretion may be limited to some extent by the division of
competence between the Community and the Member State, by fundamental rights, and by general
principles such as the principle of subsidiarity.
115 Craig has termed such discretion ‘jurisdictional discretion’: Craig, op cit n 40 supra, at 433.
116 ibid, at 434.
117 ibid, at 433.
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As an intensity-determining factor, the use of the degree of discretion can be
explained by the ‘better placed’ argument mentioned in section II. Legislative organs
are generally better equipped than the courts to take difficult political decisions, to
assess complex sets of conflicting interests and to investigate all kinds of possible
solutions and measures. Similarly, if the legislature has considered that administrative
discretion is necessary to meet the specific aims of a certain regulation, for example
because a certain agency is well suited to gather relevant facts or to formulate a policy
for the application of certain rules, there is good reason for the court to respect the
decisions resulting from the exercise of such powers.118 It is therefore not surprising that
the existence of wide regulatory or administrative discretion has such a great impact on
the intensity of review by the European courts. If the relevant Community provisions
grant wide discretionary powers to the institutions, and especially if the exercise of such
powers requires political choices and complex economic or social assessments to be
made, the European courts usually consider this to constitute a good reason for
deference.119
The specific reasons given by the EU courts themselves for deference vary from case
to case. Although the courts most often mention the factors of political choice and the
necessity of making complex social and economic assessments, they sometimes also
refer to particular difficulties, such as the need for highly technical assessments,120 or the
difficulties in legislating on questions which are delicate and controversial from a
scientific viewpoint121. The EU courts only rarely refer to the formulation of the
relevant regulative norms as a basis for marginal review.122 More often, the courts stress
in general that the Community legislature has a broad discretion corresponding to the
political responsibilities given to it by the relevant EC provisions.123 For example, in the
Chiquita case, the Court of First Instance held that its judicial review ought to be
limited, ‘ . . . especially if, in establishing a common organisation of the market, the
Council is required to reconcile divergent interests and thus to select options within the
context of the policy choices which are its own responsibility’.124
The effect of the very marginal test in Chiquita was that the Court of First Instance
really only established that the Council had weighed the relevant interests and that the
applicant had not proved that the measures were manifestly inappropriate. The burden
of proof thus was clearly placed with the disadvantaged party. The Court of First
Instance did not at all pay attention to the reasonableness of the balance struck by the
Community legislature, nor to the necessity of the measure.125 In other cases, too, the
recognition of broad discretionary powers mostly results in very marginal tests. This is
clear from the use of formulas such as the test of ‘manifest unreasonableness’ or
118 ibid, at 472.
119 eg Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, Alliance for Natural Health [2005] ECR I-6451, para 52; Joined
Cases C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04, ABNA [2005] ECR I-10423, para 69; Case C-266/05P,
Sison [2007] ECR I-1233, para 33.
120 eg Case C-326/05P, Industrias Químicas del Vallés [2007] ECR I-6557, para 75.
121 eg Case C-448/06, cp-Pharma (unreported), paras 28–30 (mentioning the situation where the need for
restrictive measures is not supported by conclusive scientific evidence).
122 See, however, Case C-266/05P, Sison [2007] ECR I-1233, paras 36–37 (referring to the very general criteria
set out in a regulation and pointing at the preparatory documents from which it appeared that a broad
discretion for the Council was envisaged).
123 eg Case T-19/01, Chiquita Brands International [2005] ECR II-315, para 228 (referring to the common
agricultural policy and Arts 34 and 37 EC); Case C-375/05, Geuting [2007] ECR I-7983, para 44.
124 Chiquita Brands International, ibid, para 228.
125 For a somewhat comparable approach, see Case C-375/05, Geuting [2007] ECR I-7983.
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‘manifest error’, as well as from the very concise and rather formal reasoning by the EU
courts. In many cases, the courts merely state that no evidence has been submitted from
which it appears that a measure is manifestly inappropriate or unnecessary, and in most
cases they do not pay any express attention to the weight and nature of the interests
harmed by the contested measure or decision.126
The factor of discretion is used in particular in cases concerning the validity of
Community measures. Nonetheless, it is also sometimes visible in cases about
national measures. An example is the case of Danske Svineproducenter, in which the
ECJ accepted that the Member States must be recognised to have a clear margin of
discretion since the applicable directive did not lay down specific technical require-
ments as regards animal transport.127 This finding may be explained by the fact that
the national legislature in this case really operated as an extension of the Community
legislature. The formulas that are normally used by the courts in the context of Com-
munity regulatory acts were therefore applied to national legislation. Interestingly,
however, the national legislation was subjected to the substantive standards applying
to national legislation, ie the requirements of necessity and proportionality rather
than the standards of manifest inappropriateness or manifest error. Although the
ECJ finally concluded that the national measures corresponded to these standards,
the standards themselves were purportedly somewhat stricter than those
applied to ‘real’ Community measures. Thus, there may still be some difference
between the margin of discretion allowed to Community institutions and to national
institutions.
In the case of Dankse Svineproducenter, another explanation for the ECJ’s height-
ened review might be found in the risk that national measures harm inter-state trade,
which is in itself an argument for stricter scrutiny. The ECJ mostly does not pay express
attention to the existence of such conflicting factors. Usually, it just silently heightens
the intensity of its review, which means that it takes a closer look at the overall
reasonableness of the measure. Another example of this can be found in the case of
ABNA, concerning a Community measure that imposed an obligation on animal feed
producers to provide highly detailed information about all the feed materials and their
amount in feeding-stuffs.128 According to the feed producers, the measure seriously
affected their economic interests as it obliged them to disclose the formulas for the
composition of their products. They thereby ran the risk of those products being used
as models by the customers, the manufacturers not being able to benefit of the invest-
ments made in terms of research and innovation. The ECJ mentioned the broad
discretion enjoyed by the Community legislature and referred to the test of manifest
inappropriateness as the relevant standard.129 Subsequently, however, it looked criti-
cally at the need to adopt such an intrusive measure and it finally concluded that no
necessity for it could be established in the case.130 The resultant test was clearly more
intensive than that used in, for example, the Chiquita case. The most likely explanation
for this can be found in the ECJ’s express reference to the serious impact of the
126 There are some cases in which the test is rather more elaborate; even then, however, the test closely follows
the lines of the relevant measure and its legislative history—see, eg, Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04,
Alliance for Natural Health [2005] ECR I-6451, paras 55 ff.
127 Case C-491/06, Danske Svineproducenter [2008] ECR I-3339, para 38.
128 Joined Cases C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04, ABNA [2005] ECR I-10423.
129 ibid, para 69.
130 ibid, paras 83–85.
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obligation for the economic interests of manufacturers, which were close to property
rights.131 The precise interaction between the conflicting factors, however, remains
unclear.
d) Fundamental Rights
Finally, the EU courts’ review can be intensified if a fundamental right of an individual
has been interfered with.132 It has already been mentioned that the EU courts’ assess-
ment of a case may be stricter if important economic interests of manufacturers have
been seriously interfered with, even if Community legislature generally has broad
discretion to regulate the issue.133 Normally, however, strict scrutiny is almost exclu-
sively limited to cases concerning fundamental rights as recognised on the basis of the
common traditions of the Member States and the case-law of the ECtHR.134 A classic
example is the case of Familiapress, concerning an Austrian prohibition on the distri-
bution of newspapers and magazines containing crossword puzzles.135 The result of the
prohibition was that a German publisher could not distribute a weekly magazine in
Austria. The ECJ held that the Austrian prohibition did not only harm inter-state
trade, but it also interfered with the publisher’s freedom of expression. Although it did
not expressly state that this should be cause for intensified review, and it even left the
final decision on necessity and proportionality of the prohibition to the national courts,
the ECJ formulated very clear and strict standards of review. Implicitly, thus, the
interference with a fundamental right seems to have led the ECJ to apply a heightened
standard of review.136
Even if a fundamental right is at stake, however, it seems clear that the EU courts will
not always regard this as a reason for intensified review. The courts rather seem to
apply a kind of ‘core right’ doctrine, which means that they only intensify the level of
review if the very essence of a certain fundamental right has been affected. By using this
doctrine the courts seem to copy some elements of the margin of appreciation doctrine
that has been developed by the ECtHR.137 The scope of this margin differs from case to
case, depending on the interests and rights that are at stake.138 The effect of this is
clearly visible in the case of Karner, which concerned restrictive Austrian legislation on
misleading advertisements.139 The ECJ found that this legislation affected the freedom
of expression and it stressed that this freedom constitutes one of the pillars of demo-
cratic society. However, referring to the case-law of the ECtHR on commercial expres-
sion, it considered that:
131 ibid, para 82.
132 cf de Búrca, op cit n 54 supra, at 146.
133 See section IIIBc; Joined Cases C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04, ABNA [2005] ECR I-10423. Cf
de Búrca, ibid, at 123.
134 This situation differs from that analysed in section IIIBa, which concerned measures that were protective
of fundamental rights and thereby harmed Community interests. In those cases the effect of the presence
of fundamental rights is contrariwise—the Member States are afforded more discretion to protect these
interest and, consequently, the court’s test is rather marginal in character. This section concerns the
opposite situation, in which national or Community measures clearly harm individual fundamental
rights. See also Craig, op cit n 40 supra, at 672.
135 Case C-368/95, Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689, para 24.
136 For other examples, see in particular Craig, op cit n 40 supra, at 672–673.
137 See section IVCd.
138 ibid.
139 Case C-71/02, Karner [2004] ECR I-3024, para 51.
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[w]hen the exercise of the freedom does not contribute to a discussion of public interest and, in addition,
arises in a context in which the Member States have a certain amount of discretion, review is limited to
an examination of the reasonableness and proportionality of the interference. This holds true for the
commercial use of freedom of expression, particularly in a field as complex and fluctuating as
advertising.140
Thus, the EU courts will only apply intensified review if the measure actually and
seriously affects an important fundamental right.141 In practice, such cases are rare.
C Conclusion
The case-law analysis provided in this section has disclosed that the EU courts do
indeed vary the intensity of their review. In determining the level of intensity, they
sometimes expressly refer to arguments such as the ‘better placed’ argument, but they
also implicitly make use of other arguments for variation. It has been mentioned, for
example, that the EU courts’ review is intensified if essential fundamental rights have
been affected or if the national measures under scrutiny impede the achievement of the
central aims and objectives of the Community. It is also clear that the EU courts
sometimes use the possibilities for variation in intensity of review to solve particular
problems of pluralism. The EU courts tend to apply deferential review if the aim of a
certain measure is to protect individual interests that are considered to be of great
importance on the national level, or on which there is no clear European consensus.
Even if such a measure harms Community interests, respect for national traditions and
constitutional values implies that the EU courts will not readily strike it down.
This means that the seeds for a European ‘doctrine of deference’ are already there.
However, it is submitted that much better results could be achieved if the courts would
use the possibilities of variable intensity of review far more systematically and struc-
turally.142 The present approach towards the levels of intensity seems to be rather
haphazard and random. Both EU courts often mention formulas or standards associ-
ated with a certain intensity of review, but they do not really explain why a certain level
of intensity is applied or what the choice for this level entails in terms of burden of proof
or standards of review.143 In addition, it is far from clear what the resulting level of
review should be if intensity-determining factors pull in different directions.
Improvement of the legal reasoning of the EU courts on this issue is desirable,
particularly against the background of the debate about constitutional pluralism and
judicial review of legislation and policy decisions.144 Contentedly, some inspiration as
regards the possibilities of variable intensity of review can be found in the doctrine of
the margin of appreciation as developed by the ECtHR. That is where this article will
turn now.
140 Para 51.
141 See for a similar example Case C-491/01, British American Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11453, paras 123, 149
and 153, in which the court applied a marginal test to an interference with property rights.
142 cf Craig, op cit n 40 supra, at 471.
143 ibid, at 469–470.
144 ibid, at 472; Craig argues that it is necessary for the Community courts to find some principled basis for
distinguishing the areas where they are willing to engage in more intensive factual scrutiny from those
where they are not.
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IV The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine of the ECtHR as a Source
of Inspiration
A Introduction
Although the value of the margin of appreciation doctrine to the case-law of the
ECtHR is sometimes questioned, it is widely accepted that the doctrine constitutes an
important instrument for the ECtHR to accommodate its complex role as an interna-
tional human rights court. Of course, the position of the ECtHR is different from that
of the EU courts. Where the ECJ has developed a doctrine of supremacy and where its
judgments in the preliminary reference procedure have erga omnes effect,145 such a high
level of penetration in the national legal orders is not visible in the context of the
European Convention on Human Rights (the convention).146 Although the ECtHR’s
decisions are binding, this is only so for the parties to the case decided by the court.147
Furthermore, the ECtHR itself has stressed that there is no direct effect, let alone
supremacy, of the convention provisions in the national legal orders.148 As is true for all
international law, the way the convention and the decisions of the ECtHR are imple-
mented in national law is determined by the national constitutions.149 In addition, even
if the ECtHR has made clear that it has the ultimate power to protect the rights laid
down in the convention,150 it has not at all claimed that any degree of transfer of
sovereignty has taken place.151 At least formally, this means that the harmonising effect
of the convention and the judgments of the ECtHR cannot be as obvious as that of EU
legislation and the decisions of the ECJ.152 It also means that the ECtHR to a lesser
extent than the EU courts has to deal with the specific problematic of constitutional
145 cf Rosas, op cit n 27 supra, at 16–42.
146 cf D. Nicol, ‘Lessons from Luxembourg: Federalisation and the Court of Human Rights’, (2001) 26
European Law Review—Human Rights Survey HR/1, at HR/3 and Helfer and Slaughter, op cit n 9 supra,
at 297.
147 Art 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
148 cf C. Warbrick, ‘“Federal” Aspects of the European Convention of Human Rights’, (1989) 10 Michigan
Journal of International Law 698, at 699. Nonetheless, the ECtHR has observed that the convention is
more than ‘just’ an international convention (Application No 5310/71, Ireland v UK (IRA Case) Series A
No 25, para 25; see Nicol, op cit n 146 supra, at HR/11).
149 See expressly Application No 8793/73, James and Others v UK Series A No 98, para 84, where the court
stressed that there is no obligation to incorporate the convention into domestic law and reiterated that
‘ . . . neither Article 13 nor the Convention in general lays down for the Contracting States any given
manner for ensuring within their internal law the effective implementation of any of the provisions of the
Convention’. Cf G. Ress, ‘The Effect of Decisions and Judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights in the Domestic Legal Order’, (2005) 40 Texas International Law Journal 359, at 374. Of course
there is supervision on the execution of the judgments of the ECtHR by the Committee of Ministers, but
this supervision is one of persuasion rather than of real force; cf Warbrick, ibid, at 705. Although this
might seem to be an important difference between the EU legal order and the convention legal order, this
may be nuanced to a certain extent by the fact that EU law, too, relies to a large extent on the
constitutional arrangements of the EU Member States, albeit in a rather different manner; on this, see
Wouters, op cit n 29 supra, at 33.
150 cf Application No 6538/74, Sunday Times v UK Series A No 30, para 59; see also Warbrick, op cit n 148
supra, at 719.
151 To the contrary, the court tends to stress its subsidiary position and the primary responsibility of the
states to guarantee the rights protected by the convention. See recently also, eg, Application No 46598/06,
Branko Tomašić v Croatia (unreported) 15 January 2009, paras 73–74.
152 cf Helfer and Slaughter, op cit n 9 supra, at 297. See also Nicol, who has indicated that ‘[o]n the spectrum
of federalism . . . the Court of Human Rights . . . would sit somewhere between a classical international
tribunal and the European Community’s Court of Justice’: Nicol, op cit n 146 supra, at HR/3.
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pluralism, since this problematic is the particular result of the existence of two different
legal orders that both lay a claim to final authority.
Such obvious differences notwithstanding, it is possible to detect important similari-
ties between the ECtHR and the EU courts.153 In practice, the convention is increas-
ingly regarded as part and parcel of each national legal order.154 The impact of the
ECtHR’s interpretations reaches far beyond the individual case at hand.155 By defining
positive obligations for the state parties as regards the enforcement of the convention,
the ECtHR has influenced national policy and legislation with an increasing direct-
ness.156 In recent years, it has even resorted to giving recommendations to the states to
solve violations of the convention or to prevent future violations from occurring.157
This does not mean an actual change in the legal or constitutional position of the
convention or of the ECtHR.158 It does mean, however, that its position is more similar
to that of the EU courts than might seem to be the case if the legal situation were taken
at face value.159
The increasing embeddedness of the convention in the national legal orders also
appears to bring along some discussions of a pluralistic nature.160 In particular the
German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has stressed that,
even though it will normally follow the lead of the ECtHR, its own national constitu-
tion will remain the final test for application of the convention.161 In recent years,
153 cf Nicol, ibid, at HR/3.
154 Warbrick noted already in 1989 that ‘ . . . [t]he European practice surprises because it interprets the
Convention in a way which carries the provisions of the treaty so deeply into the legal systems of the
member States, favoring a European standard over diverse national ones’: Warbrick, op cit n 148 supra,
at 699. See also Nicol, ibid, at HR/19 (‘Gradually familiarity bred acceptance among national poli-
ties . . . ’). It is sometimes even derived from this factual development that the interpretations provided by
the ECtHR could be regarded as generally binding; see, in particular, S. Beljin, ‘Bundesverfassungsgericht
on the Status of the European Convention of Human Rights and ECHR Decisions in the German Legal
Order. Decision of 14 October 2004’, (2005) 1 European Constitutional Law Review 553, at 558–559,
referring to the reasoning provided by the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Görgülü case
(Bundesverfassungsgericht 2 BvR 1481/04 of 14 October 2004).
155 See further J.H. Gerards, ‘Judicial Deliberations in the European Court of Human Rights’, in N. Huls,
M. Adams and J. Bomhoff (eds), The Legitimacy of Highest Courts’ Rulings. Judicial Deliberations and
Beyond (T.M.C Asser Press, 2009), 407, at 410 ff; L.R. Helfer, ‘Redesigning the European Court of
Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Stuctural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime’,
(2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 125.
156 cf Nicol, op cit n 146 supra, at HR/15 ff. For an elaborate analysis of the various ways in which the
ECtHR has given indirect effect to the convention, see Christoffersen, op cit n 38 supra, at 367 ff.
157 See, eg, Application No 71503/01, Assanidze v Georgia ECHR 2004-II and Application No 27527/03, L
v Lithuania (unreported) 11 September 2007. This is further illustrated by the development of the
instrument of ‘pilot-judgments’. In these judgments, the court does not limit itself to finding a violation
of the convention, but it also indicates with some precision which measures should be taken on the
national level to compensate, repair or, if possible, end a violation; see, eg, Application No 31443/96,
Broniowski v Poland ECHR 2004-V; Application No 23032/02, Lukenda v Slovenia ECHR 2005-X;
Application No 35014/97, Hutten-Czapska v Poland (unreported) 19 June 2006. See also Helfer, op cit n
155 supra, at 146 ff.
158 In fact, the result of the ECtHR’s approach is that national courts are empowered rather than weakened,
since the ECtHR increasingly regards them as the primary enforcers of convention rights; see Nicol, op cit
n 146 supra, at HR/18.
159 cf Helfer and Slaughter, op cit n 9 supra, at 297.
160 cf Helfer, op cit n 155 supra, at 130.
161 Bundesverfassungsgericht 2 BvR 1481/04 of 14 October 2004. See in particular H.J. Papier, ‘Execution and
Effects of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights from the Perspective of German
National Courts’, (2006) 27 Human Rights Law Journal 1, at 2; M. Hartwig, ‘Much Ado About Human
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moreover, some leading scholars have openly doubted the mandate and legitimacy of
the ECtHR to decide cases about fundamental rights.162 This means that the ECtHR
still has to struggle for the acceptance of its decisions and that its legitimacy is fragile.
Careful attention to national sensitivities and differences still is an essential key to
success.
Even though the EU courts and the ECtHR are totally different courts that operate
in different contexts, there are thus sufficient similarities between them to make a
comparison worth wile of the ways in which they deal with problems of pluralism. In
this regard, it is valuable to recall that the ECtHR has noted early in its existence that
a notion of judicial deference is essential to a court that finds itself in a supranational
position:
. . . the Court cannot disregard those legal and factual features which characterise the life of the society
in the State which, as a Contracting Party, has to answer for the measure in dispute. In so doing it cannot
assume the rôle of the competent national authorities, for it would thereby lose sight of the subsidiary
nature of the international machinery of collective enforcement established by the Convention. The
national authorities remain free to choose the measures which they consider appropriate in those matters
which are governed by the Convention. Review by the Court concerns only the conformity of these
measures with the requirements of the Convention.163
It is clear from these considerations that it is mainly the classic argument of subsidiarity
that has inspired the ECtHR to develop its famous margin of appreciation doctrine.164
The doctrine is based on the premise that it should primarily be left to the states to
secure the rights protected by the convention—the ECtHR should only intervene if it
is clear that they have not succeeded in doing so.165 In addition, it transpires from the
case that the court does not find itself well- to substitute a national legislature’s opinion
for its own.166 It has also often been argued in defence of the doctrine that adequate
protection of fundamental rights can be achieved in a variety of ways, so that it is
certainly not always reasonable to proclaim that the ECtHR’s approach is the only
correct one.167 It is important to guarantee fundamental rights in a way that matches
the differences between national traditions and perceptions and that allows for cultural
variation.168 At the same time, the ECtHR must be watchful that fundamental rights
Rights: The Federal Constitutional Court Confronts the European Court of Human Rights’, (2005) 6
German Law Journal 869, at 875; see also Gerards, op cit n 155 supra, at 411.
162 See most recently Lord Hoffmann, ‘The Universality of Human Rights’, Judicial Studies Board Annual
Lecture (19 March 2009), in particular paras 23 and 38.
163 Application No 1474/62, Belgian Linguistics Case Series A No 6, para I.B.10. See also Christoffersen,
op cit n 38 supra, at 248.
164 See in particular Application No 5493/72, Handyside v UK Series A No 24, para 48. Cf Helfer, op cit n 155
supra, at 128–129 and Christoffersen, ibid, at 229.
165 See G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University
Press, 2007), at 83. This also has practical advantages, as stressed by Helfer and Arai-Takahashi—if
domestic judges and authorities act as ‘first-line defenders’ of convention rights, this will enhance judicial
expediency and efficiency on the level of the ECtHR. Having regard to its limited resources, such a
division of labour is of great value to the ECtHR: Helfer, op cit n 155 supra, at 128 and Y. Arai-
Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence
of the ECHR (Intersentia, 2002).
166 cf Arai-Takahashi, ibid, at 240.
167 Gerards, op cit n 42 supra, at 168; see also Helfer, op cit n 155 supra, at 134; Arai-Takahashi, op cit n 165
supra, at 241; Warbrick, op cit n 148 supra, at 716.
168 See Arai-Takahashi, ibid, at 235; Lord Hoffmann, op cit n 162 supra; S. Greer, The European Convention
on Human Rights. Achievements, Problems and Prospects (Cambridge University Press, 2006), at 224.
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are guaranteed at a proper level and that cultural relativism is avoided.169 In this area
of tension, a margin of appreciation doctrine is a useful and flexible tool to determine
the intensity of review of interferences with fundamental rights.170 For that reason, the
doctrine and its application will further be analysed in this section in some detail. First,
a general overview will be provided of the operation of the doctrine (section IVB).
Thereafter, the various factors determining the scope of the margin will be discussed
(section IVC).
B Effects of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine
Just like the ECJ and the Court of First Instance, the court uses a sliding scale model
of intensity of review. Although it does distinguish between a ‘narrow margin’, a
‘certain margin’ and a ‘wide margin’, these formulas cannot be regarded as indicating
specific ‘tests’ or ‘levels’ that result in a certain apportionment of the burden of proof
or in an exact set of standards of review.171 Nevertheless, there is a relatively clear
difference between a wide margin and a narrow one. If a wide margin is allowed to the
national authorities, the court usually only superficially and rather generally examines
the choices made by the national authorities to see whether the result is (clearly)
unreasonable or disproportionate, or places an excessive burden on the applicant.172
The burden of proof to show that a national measure is unjustified is then often placed
with the applicant parties.173 In addition, the court frequently applies a rather
169 See, eg, P. Mahoney, ‘Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?’, (1998) 19
Human Rights Law Journal 1, at 12 and A. Ostrovsky, ‘What’s So Funny About Peace, Love, and
Understanding? How the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine Preserves Core Human Rights within Cul-
tural Diversity and Legitimises International Human Rights Tribunals’, (2005) 1 Hanse Law Review 47,
at 57.
170 R. St. J. Macdonald, ‘The Margin of Appreciation’, in R. St. J. Macdonald, F. Matscher and H. Petzold
(eds), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), 83, at 123;
Arai-Takahashi, op cit n 165 supra, at 236; Ostrovsky, ibid, at 58.
171 On the problematic translation from margin of appreciation into standards of review, see elaborately
Christoffersen, op cit n 38 supra, at 265 ff and N. Lavender, ‘The Problem of the Margin of Appreciation’,
(1997) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 380, at 387 ff.
172 A classic example of deferential review is the case of Application No 8793/73, James and Others v UK
Series A No 98, in which the court allowed the national authorities a wide margin of appreciation in the
context of property regulation. This wide margin corresponded to a lenient test of necessity, the court
explaining that ‘[i]t is not for the Court to say whether the legislation represented the best solution for
dealing with the problem or whether the legislative discretion should have been exercised in another way’
(para 51). For other examples, see Application No 8777/79, Rasmussen v Denmark Series A No 87,
para 41; Application No 36515/97, Fretté v France ECHR 2002-I, para 42; Application No 69498/01, Pla
and Puncernau v Andorra ECHR 2004-VIII, para 46; Application No 73049/01, Anheuser-Busch Inc v
Portugal (unreported) 11 January 2007, para 83; Application No 59894/0, Bulgakov v Ukraine (unre-
ported) 11 September 2007; Application No 35991/04, Kearns v France (unreported) 10 January 2008,
paras 80–84. See further Gerards, op cit n 42 supra, at 155; P. Mahoney, ‘Judicial Activism and Judicial
Self-Restraint in the European Court of Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin’, (1990) 11 Human
Rights Law Journal 57, at 78 and 87.
173 See, eg, Application No 18215/06, Greenpeace eV and Others v Germany (unreported) 12 May 2009
(decision). In this case the applicants complained of the refusal by the German government to take specific
measures against car manufacturers in order to reduce respirable car dust emissions of diesel vehicles. The
ECtHR held that it has a fundamentally subsidiary role in this type of case. Bearing this role in mind, it
held that ‘ . . . the applicants have not shown—and the documents submitted do not demonstrate—that
the Contracting State, when it refused to take the specific measures requested by the applicants, exceeded
its discretionary power . . . ’.
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procedural test in these cases—if it finds that the case has been carefully assessed and
decided by the national authorities, it will mostly not find a violation.174 By contrast, if
a narrow margin is left, the court generally closely considers the facts of the case,
carefully determining the interests at stake and deciding for itself where the balance
between the conflicting interests should have been struck. The national authorities then
bear the burden to show that the limitation of rights was based on careful and objective
assessment of facts and interests and, more generally, that it was reasonable.175 Fur-
thermore, in most of these cases the court applies a strict test of necessity or subsid-
iarity, often mentioning the availability of less intrusive measures to underpin its
judgment that the interference cannot be held to be justified, or criticising the lack of
possibilities for individualised judgments on the national level.176 Finally, the court in
many cases requires additional procedural safeguards to be afforded by domestic
law.177
The general line in the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine thus seems
to be relatively clear. However, the practical application of the margin of appreciation
doctrine is often appraised much more critically.178 First of all, there does not always
appear to be a close correspondence between the language of deference and the actual
test applied by the court. It all too often occurs that the court elaborately reasons that
a wide margin of appreciation should be left to the state, but it then carefully assesses
the facts of the case to find out which interests were at stake and what weight should be
accorded to these interests.179 In the end the court may decide how these interests
should be balanced, comparing the outcome of the national procedures with the result
it considers to be the most desirable. If the national decision does not agree with the
court’s preferred outcome, it will find a violation of the convention regardless of the
wide scope of the national margin of appreciation. Such a lack of correspondence
between the margin of appreciation and the actual review of the measures or decisions
can be regarded as a serious shortcoming, since it renders some of the possible advan-
tages of the doctrine (predictability, clarity) simply non-existent. The same is true for
the fact that the court frequently just mentions the margin of appreciation test and
some factors determining its width, without explaining what the precise scope of the
margin in the concrete case should be.180 Some scholars have even argued that the court
174 Eg Application No 36515/97, Fretté v France ECHR 2002-I, para 42; Application No 11810/03, Maurice
v France (unreported) 6 October 2005, paras 118 ff; Application No 6339/05, Evans v UK (unreported) 10
April 2007, paras 83 ff; Application No 75201/01, Grušovnik v Slovenia (unreported) 9 June 2009 (deci-
sion). However, even a procedural test, combined with a wide margin of appreciation, may result in a
finding of a violation; see, eg, Application No 44362/04, Dickson v UK ECHR 2007-VIII, para 85.
175 See, eg, Application No 66746/01, Connors v UK (unreported) 27 May 2004, para 94. See also Application
No 35082/04, Makhmudov v Russia (unreported) 26 July 2007.
176 Eg Application No 13914/88, Informationsverein Lentia v Austria Series A No 276, paras 39 and 42;
Application No 39293/98, Fuentes Bobo v Spain (unreported) 29 February 2000, para 49; Application Nos
30562/04 and 30566/04, S and Marper v UK (unreported) 4 December 2008, paras 119–120.
177 eg S and Marper v UK, ibid, paras 103–104.
178 For a conceptual analysis of the problems related to the court’s application of the doctrine, see in
particular Letsas, op cit n 165 supra, at 80 ff.
179 For some recent examples, see Application No 69498/01, Pla and Puncernau v Andorra ECHR 2004-VIII;
Application No 76900/01, Öllinger v Austria (unreported) 29 June 2006; Application No 34438/04 Egeland
and Hanseid v Norway (unreported) 16 April 2009; Application No 28070/06 A v Norway (unreported) 9
April 2009.
180 See eg Application No 6303/05, Masaev v Norway (unreported) 12 May 2009, in which the court first
stated that, according to settled case-law, it leaves ‘a certain margin of appreciation’. It continued to state
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often uses the doctrine not so much as an instrument to determine the intensity of its
review, but rather as an alternative formulation for finding a violation: If the court finds
the interference to be unjustifiable, it will also find that the domestic authorities have
transgressed their margin of appreciation.181
However, it would be unfortunate to discard the doctrine purely for reason of its
inconsistent and sloppy use. If applied well, the doctrine might prove to be an inter-
esting and important instrument to negotiate between the interests concerned with
national and supranational decision-making and the interest of protecting fundamental
rights on a sufficiently high level. For that reason, it is still valuable to analyse the
factors used by the court to determine its intensity of review.
C Determining the Scope of the Margin of Appreciation
a) Introduction
In contrast to the ECJ, the ECtHR has often expressly listed the various factors that are
relevant in determining the scope of the margin of appreciation and, consequently, the
intensity of its review. The court itself gave the following overview of relevant factors
in S and Marper v UK:182
A margin of appreciation must be left to the competent national authorities . . . The breadth of this
margin varies and depends on a number of factors including the nature of the Convention right in issue,
its importance for the individual, the nature of the interference and the object pursued by the interfer-
ence. The margin will tend to be narrower where the right at stake is crucial to the individual’s effective
enjoyment of intimate or key rights . . . Where a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence
or identity is at stake, the margin allowed to the State will be restricted . . . Where, however, there is no
consensus within the Member States of the Council of Europe, either as to the relative importance of the
interest at stake or as to how best to protect it, the margin will be wider . . . 183
These general considerations do not, however, provide much clarity on the meaning of
the named factors, which are broadly and rather vaguely formulated. In what follows,
an attempt will therefore be made to shed some light on the interpretation of the
various factors and their interaction. Hereinafter, three main factors will be distin-
guished: the ‘common ground’ factor (section IVCb), the ‘better placed’ argument
(section IVCc) and the nature of the affected right or interest (section IVCd). In the
academic literature on the margin of appreciation doctrine, many more factors have
that ‘[i]n order to determine the scope of the margin of appreciation in the present case the Court must
take into account what is at stake, namely the need to maintain true religious pluralism’ (para 24).
However, it did not conclude whether this means that the margin of appreciation should be wide or
narrow, or something in between. As a result, the reader should derive any notion as to the applicable
intensity of review from an interpretation of the substantive parts of the judgment, which is not how the
margin of appreciation should work. See also Application No 29492/05, Kudeshkina v Russia (unreported)
26 February 2009, where the court only mentioned that ‘a certain margin’ should be left, without
clarifying the scope of the margin in the particular case.
181 See already MacDonald, op cit n 170 supra, at 85. Letsas has described this use as implying ‘substantive
concept’ of the doctrine, which should not be confused with the ‘structural concept’ that primarily
indicates the limits or intensity of review: Letsas, op cit n 165 supra, at 81. See, eg, Application
No 34753/03, Phull v France ECHR 2005-I; Application No 21277/05, Standard Verlags GmbH v Austria
(No 2) (unreported) 4 June 2009, para 54; in both cases the court found no violation of the convention
since the national authorities remained within their margin of appreciation.
182 Application Nos 30562/04 and 30566/04, S and Marper v UK (unreported) 4 December 2008.
183 Para 102. An even more elaborate version can be found in Application No 66746/01, Connors v UK
(unreported) 27 May 2004, para 82.
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been distinguished, such as the character and weight of the aims pursued, the character
of the state obligations, the seriousness of the interference184 and the context of the
interference.185 In the case-law practice of the ECtHR, however, these additional
factors appear to be closely related to the three main factors distinguished in this
article.
b) The Common Ground Factor
According to the ECtHR, one of the most important intensity determining factors is
the existence or lack of a ‘common ground’.186 In determining the scope of the margin
of appreciation the ECtHR often refers to the existence or non-existence of a general
consensus (or common ground) within the Council of Europe regarding the subject of
the case at hand.187 Generally, the use of the common ground factor means that the
court will leave a wide margin of appreciation if there is no, or hardly any, consensus
between the European states. There is well-known case-law of the court on the differ-
ence between such aims as the ‘protection of morals’ and ‘maintaining the authority
and impartiality of the judiciary’. The court considered in its classic Handyside case that
it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various contracting states a uniform
European conception of morals, and it held that the view taken by the national
legislation of the requirements of morals varies from time to time and from place to
place.188 For that reason it found that national authorities are in principle in a better
position than the international judge to given an opinion on the exact content of these
requirements.189 In its later Sunday Times judgment, the court held that ‘[p]recisely the
same cannot be said of the far more objective notion of the “authority of the judi-
ciary”’.190 It found that the domestic law and practice of the states revealed a fairly
substantial measure of common ground in this area. Accordingly, it concluded that a
more extensive European supervision could be considered reasonable.191
The use of the common ground factor can easily be explained from the perspective of
subsidiarity and the need to take decisions at the European level that are acceptable to
184 If an interference with a fundamental right is very serious or even irreversible, the court expects stronger
and more compelling reasons to be advanced in justification; see, eg, Connors v UK, ibid, para 86;
Application Nos 46720, 72203/01 and 72552/01, Jahn and Others v Germany (unreported) 30 June 2005,
para 94. The court mostly combines the factor of the nature or seriousness of the interference with the
factor of the importance of the right concerned, or it considers the seriousness of the interference
primarily in its substantive review of the balance struck by the national authorities. For that reason, this
factor will not be independently discussed in this section.
185 See in particular Arai-Takahashi, op cit n 165 supra, at 206 ff.
186 cf Judge Malinverni, concurring opinion in the case of Application No 34438/04, Egeland and Hanseid v
Norway (unreported) 16 April 2009, para 6.
187 For some recent examples, see Application No 59894/00, Bulgakov v Ukraine (unreported) 11 September
2007, para 43(c); Application No 44362/04, Dickson v UK ECHR 2007-VIII, para 78; Application Nos
30562/04 and 30566/04, S and Marper v UK (unreported) 4 December 2008, para 102. The ECtHR also
often refers to the common ground argument in cases concerning the meaning and scope of the conven-
tion provisions—it is then used as an interpretive instrument, rather than as an intensity-determining
factor (see recently, eg, Application No 3453/97, Demir and Baykara v Turkey (unreported) 12 November
2008, paras 65–86). The specific case-law relating to the common ground argument as an interpretative
instrument will not be discussed in the context of this article.
188 Application No 5493/72, Handyside v UK Series A No 24, para 47.
189 ibid. See also, eg, Application No 17419/90, Wingrove v UK ECHR 1996-V, para 58; Application
No 21830, X, Y and Z v UK ECHR 1997-II, para 44; Application No 44179/98, Murphy v Ireland ECHR
2003-IX, para 67.
190 Application No 6538/74, Sunday Times v UK Series A No 30, para 46.
191 ibid.
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the states. A clear lack of European consensus implies that there will be hardly any
support for the ECtHR to provide a far-reaching judgment on a sensitive issue. This is
different if there is clear evidence of European agreement on a certain issue. The court
can then easily follow the general opinion prevailing in the European states, which may
enhance the legitimacy and acceptability of its judgments. Conversely, the lack of a
European consensus may justify a wide margin,192 since the court may then not feel
empowered to take a critical ‘second look’ at the national measure or decision. As an
intensity-determining factor in a pluralist legal order, the common ground factor is
clearly attractive.193 In addition, it seems rather easy to establish the existence or lack of
a common ground in an objective manner. The ECtHR itself often refers to compara-
tive law materials or to international legal instruments and soft law from which the
presence or lack of a common ground clearly appears.194 Nevertheless, the use of the
common ground factor is much criticised, especially since it is far less easy to establish
a the presence of a European consensus than it is made to appear.195 First, it is very
difficult to determine the amount of convergence or agreement needed to speak of a real
‘common ground’. In some cases, the court has held that no complete unanimity is
required, but that ‘clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend’
will suffice to narrow the margin of appreciation.196 Other cases would seem to indicate,
however, that much more than a trend is needed.197 Another important difficulty is that
the results of any comparative analysis may be interpreted in a variety of ways.198 The
ambiguity to which the factor may give rise is witnessed by the case of Egeland and
Hanseid, which concerned the Norwegian prohibition of the publication of photo-
graphs of a convicted person on her way out of the court building.199 The majority of
the chamber that decided the case held that it could not be said that there was a
European consensus on the need to leave this issue to the self-regulation by the press,
since similar prohibitions existed in Cyprus, England and Wales, while legal restrictions
192 See Application No 44362/04, Dickson v UK ECHR 2007-VIII, para 78; Application No 35991/04, Kearns
v France (unreported) 10 January 2008, paras 74 and 83. In rare cases, however, it is precisely the existence
of a European consensus that points to a wide margin of appreciation, namely in the situation that there
is general agreement that interference with a certain convention right is acceptable. See, eg, Application
No 5100/71, Engel and Others v Netherlands Series A No 22, para 72; Application No 36536/02, B and L
v UK (unreported) 13 September 2005, para 36.
193 cf P. Mahoney, ‘The Comparative Method in Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights:
Reference Back to National Law’, in G. Canivet, M. Andenas and D. Fairgrieve (eds), Comparative Law
Before the Courts (BIICL, 2004), 135, at 146–147; P.G. Carozza, ‘Propter Honoris Respectum: Uses and
Misuses of Comparative Law in International Human Rights: Some Reflections on the Jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights’, (1998) 73 Notre Dame Law Review 1217, at 1227.
194 For recent examples, see, eg, Application No 21132/05, TV Vest AS & Rogaland Pensjonistparti v Norway
(unreported) 11 December 2008, para 67 (referring to a comparative survey produced by the respondent
government) and Application No 3545/04, Brauer v Germany (unreported) 28 May 2009, para 40 (refer-
ring to a European convention which is in force in respect of 21 Member States of the Council of Europe
(but not in the respondent state) as a basis for finding a European consensus).
195 eg Ostrovsky, op cit n 169 supra, at 58; Carozza, op cit n 196 supra, at 1233.
196 Application No 28957/95, Christine Goodwin v UK ECHR 2002-IV, para 85. See also Application
No 44306/98 Appleby v UK ECHR 2003-VI, para 46.
197 See, eg, Application No 31253/96, McElhinney v Ireland ECHR 2001-XI; Application No 37112/9,
Fogarty v UK ECHR 2001-XI.
198 cf Mahoney, op cit n 193 supra, at 147.
199 Application No 34438/04, Egeland and Hanseid v Norway (unreported) 16 April 2009. For another
example, see Application No 44362/04, Dickson v UK ECHR 2007-VIII, para 81, in which the Grand
Chamber gave a different interpretation to the fact that more than half of the contracting states allow for
conjugal visits for prisoners than the Chamber did in its earlier judgment in the case (18 April 2006).
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also applied in Austria and Denmark.200 The majority held that the competent authori-
ties therefore should be accorded a wide margin of appreciation.201 Concurring judge
Malinverni, however, interpreted the same comparative data as meaning that in fact
only four states imposed a prohibition. In his view this meant that there was sufficient
common ground as to accord the state only a limited margin of appreciation.202
The obvious difficulties in the application of the common ground method may
damage the appearance of objectivity and legitimacy that is often associated with its
use. Even though the existence of a European common ground is an important factor
for the court in determining the need for deference, it evidently has to use this factor
with great prudence.
c) The Better Placed Argument
As explained in section IVCa, the court often leaves a wide margin of appreciation to
the states because they are in a better position to assess the necessity, suitability or
overall reasonableness of a limitation of fundamental rights.203 Some of the judges of
the ECtHR have even contended that the ‘better placed argument’ should be the only
factor to be taken into account in deciding about the margin of appreciation.204 The
factor is of special relevance with respect to measures based on complex social or
economic assessments205 or measures relating to particularly sensitive or difficult
issues.206 It has been stressed already that courts (and supranational courts in particu-
lar) are not as well equipped as legislative or administrative bodies to make complex
political, social or economic assessments or to take a decision as regards the most
desirable balance to be struck between competing interests.207 The ECtHR has men-
tioned this rationale in particular if measures are taken in specific contexts, such as
general preventive policy in the field of health care or environmental disasters,208 and
immigration law and policy.209 In those areas it is not only the equipment of the
200 Para 54.
201 Para 55.
202 Concurring opinion of Judge Malinverni (para 14).
203 The other way around, the court has also sometimes indicated that the margin of appreciation will only
play a limited role if the case does not concern an area of general policy, on which opinions within a
democratic society may reasonably differ widely and in which the role of the domestic policy maker
should be given special weight. See, eg, Application No 11002/05, Associated Society of Locomotive
Engineers & Firemen (ASLEF) v UK ECHR 2007-III, para 46.
204 cf Judge Rozakis, dissenting opinion to the case of Application No 34438/04, Egeland and Hanseid v
Norway (unreported) 16 April 2009.
205 See, eg, Application No 8793/73, James and Others v UK Series A No 98, para 46; Application Nos
10522/83, 11011/84, 11070/84, Mellacher and Others v Austria Series A No 169, para 45; Application
No 20348/92, Buckley v UK ECHR 1996-IV, para 74; Application No 66746/01, Connors v UK (unre-
ported) 27 May 2004, para 82; Application Nos 46720/01, 72203/01, 72552/01, Jahn and Others v Germany
(unreported) 30 June 2005, para 91; Application No 13378/05, Burden v UK (unreported) 29 April 2008,
para 60.
206 Or a combination of both; see, eg, Application No 11810/03, Maurice v France (unreported) 6 October
2005, paras 116–117.
207 On this rationale, applied to the special deference the ECtHR appears to pay to national legislatures, see
S. Marks, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and its “Democratic Society”’, (1995) 66 British
Yearbook of International Law 209, at 219 ff.
208 eg Application No 23800/06, Shelley v UK (unreported) 4 January 2008 (decision); Application
No 48939/99, Öneryildiz v Turkey ECHR 2004-XII, para 107; see also Application No 15339/02,
Budayeva and Others v Russia (unreported) 20 March 2008, para 135.
209 See Arai-Takahashi, op cit n 165 supra, at 210. A classic example is Application No 9214/80, Abdulaziz,
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national legislative and administrative authorities that is reason for the court to allow
the states a wide margin of appreciation, but also the fact that it is for the states to
regulate and control the entry and residence of aliens or to make operational choices in
terms of priorities and resources.
A wide margin is also left in cases pertaining to the protection of ‘morals’. Especially
in the cases relating to sensitive or moral issues, the ‘better placed argument’ is closely
related to the ‘common ground factor’.210 Precisely because there is hardly any consen-
sus as regards certain issues, the ECtHR finds that the national authorities are better
equipped than itself to decide about the reasonableness or appropriateness of certain
measures.211 For this reason, the court, for example, leaves a wide margin of apprecia-
tion in cases concerning sensitive issues such as adoption or in vitro fertilisation
treatment;212 in cases requiring a difficult balance to be struck between conflicting
fundamental rights and interests;213 in cases demanding highly technical and specialist
expertise;214 or in cases where specific historical circumstances (such as a recent transi-
tion to democracy) make it difficult for the court to understand the need for certain
restrictions.215 In addition, the court has often held that it is in the first place for the
national authorities to construe and apply domestic law, which means that the court
will usually pay deference if a case primarily relates to questions of interpretation,
fact-finding or valuation of evidence.216
Cabales and Balkandali v UK Series A No 94, para 67. For a more recent example, see Application
No 48321/99, Slivenko v Latvia ECHR 2003-X. It is remarkable, though, that the court does not mention
at all the margin of appreciation doctrine in its case-law on expulsion of long-term immigrants. In fact,
it seems to apply a rather strict test in these cases. See, eg, Application No 54273/00, Boultif v Switzerland
ECHR 2001-IX; Application No 46410/99, Üner v Netherlands (unreported) 18 October 2006; Applica-
tion No 42034/04, Emre v Switzerland (unreported) 22 May 2008. In the case of Application No 1638/03,
Maslov v Austria (unreported) 23 June 2008, concerning the expulsion or a minor, the court even held that
‘very serious reasons’ were required in justification, which clearly indicates a very strict test, probably
mainly inspired by the seriousness of the interference. In other immigration cases, the factors determining
the margin of appreciation seem to be merged with the factors used to examine the proportionality of a
certain measure; see, eg, Application No 16351/03, Konstantinov v Netherlands (unreported) 26 April
2007.
210 See, eg, Application No 44774/98, Leyla Sahin v Turkey ECHR 2005-XI, para 109; see also Application
No 6339/05, Evans v UK ECHR 2007-IV, para 77; Application No 27058/05, Dogru v France (unreported)
4 December 2008, para 63.
211 cf Arai-Takahashi, op cit n 165 supra, at 206–207 and Letsas, op cit n 165 supra, at 94.
212 eg Application No 21830/93, X, Y and Z v UK ECHR 1997-II, para 44; Application No 36515/97, Fretté
v France ECHR 2002-I, para 41; Application No 61564/00, Elli Poluhas Dödsbo v Sweden ECHR 2006-I,
para 25; Application No 6339/05, Evans v UK ECHR 2007-IV, paras 77 ff; Application No 35991/04,
Kearns v France (unreported) 10 January 2008, para 74.
213 For the latter situation, see, eg, Application No 25088/94, Chassagnou v France ECHR 1999-III, para 113;
Application No 6339/05, Evans v UK ECHR 2007-IV, para 77; Application No 33932/06, Todorova v Italy
(unreported) 13 January 2009, para 71. On this, see also J. Bomhoff, ‘“The Rights and Freedoms of
Others”: The ECHR and its Peculiar Category of Conflicts Between Individual rights’, in E. Brems (ed),
Conflicts between Fundamental Rights (Intersentia, 2008), 619.
214 cf Arai-Takahashi, op cit n 165 supra, at 213. See, eg, Application No 20022/92, Anne-Marie Andersson v
Sweden ECHR 1997-IV, para 36.
215 Application No 25390/94, Rekvényi v Hungary ECHR 1999-III, paras 46 and 48; Application
No 43278/98, Velikovi and Others v Bulgaria (unreported) 15 March 2007, paras 179–180; see also, mutatis
mutandis, Application No 33629/06, Vajnai v Hungary (unreported) 8 July 2008, paras 49 ff.
216 For a classic example, see Application No 6301/73, Winterwerp v Netherlands Series A No 33, para 46; see
more recently, eg, Application No 69498/01, Pla and Puncernau v Andorra ECHR 2004-VIII, para 46. See
also Arai-Takahashi, op cit n 165 supra, at 239 and Christoffersen, op cit n 38 supra, at 276.
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d) Importance of the Affected Right
The ECtHR has often stated that the nature of the convention right and its importance
for the individual are of great importance to the scope of the margin of appreciation.217
In principle, the margin of appreciation will be narrow if the essence or ‘core’ of one of
the convention rights is affected.218 The court has given much attention to the definition
of the core of certain convention rights, even though it has omitted to provide clear and
general criteria to determine which elements of rights belong to the core and which
elements should be considered rather peripheral in nature. Basing itself on the general
objectives of the convention, the court has found that there are two main concepts
underlying the convention: the maintenance and promotion of the ideals and values of
a democratic society,219 and human dignity and human freedom.220 The closer a certain
aspect of a right is related to these central concepts, the more important it is considered
to be. It is precisely because restrictions of such rights might endanger the achievement
of the convention’s objectives that the court finds strict scrutiny to be justified.
Many examples of this ‘core-periphery approach’ can be found in the case-law about
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. According to the ECtHR there is a
clear connection between effective political democracy and respect for minorities and
the realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.221 In turn, the freedom of
expression and the freedom of assembly and association (especially the freedom to form
political parties) are of prime importance to a well-functioning democracy: ‘ . . . [O]ne
of the principle characteristics of democracy [is] the possibility it offers of resolving a
country’s problems through dialogue, without recourse to violence’.222 In this light it is
not surprising that the ECtHR almost always strictly reviews limitations of political
expression and press publications relating to subjects of general interest;223 that it only
accepts the dissolution of political parties if the national government has provided
217 See the general formula quoted section IVCa.
218 eg Application No 6339/05, Evans v UK ECHR 2007-IV, para 77; Application No 44362/04, Dickson v UK
ECHR 2007-VIII, para 78; Application Nos 30562/04, 30566/04, S and Marper v UK (unreported) 4
December 2008, para 102. Cf Arai-Takahashi, op cit n 168 supra, at 227.
219 For a good overview of the court’s case-law in this respect, see Application No 1543/06, Bączkowski and
Others v Poland (unreported) 3 May 2007, paras 61 ff (‘ . . . the Convention was designed and aimed to
promote and maintain the ideals and values of a democratic society’). See also in particular Marks, op cit
n 207 supra, at 210 ff.
220 See, eg, Application No 2346/02, Pretty v UK ECHR 2002-III, para 65 (‘The very essence of the
Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom’).
221 See the case-law mentioned in n 219 supra; see also Application Nos 52562/99, 52620/99, Sørensen and
Rasmussen v Denmark ECHR 2006-I, para 58. Interestingly, the court has consistently allowed the states
a wide margin of appreciation in cases concerning the organisation of their electoral systems. See in
particular Application No 9267/81, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium Series A No 113, paras 52 and
54; see also Application No 24839/94, Bowman v UK ECHR 1998-I, paras 42–43; Application
No 74025/01, Hirst v UK (No 2) ECHR 2005-IX, para 61; Application No 10226/03, Yumak and Sadak
v Turkey (unreported) 30 January 2007, para 61.
222 Application No 19392/92, United Communist Party of Turkey v Turkey ECHR 1998-I, para 57; see also
Application No 41340/98, Refah Partisi and Others v Turkey ECHR 2003-II, para 86. See also Marks, op
cit n 207 supra, at 212–213.
223 For classic examples see Application No 6538/74, Sunday Times v UK Series A No 30 and Application
No 13585/88, Observer and Guardian v UK Series A No 216, para 59. More recent examples are Appli-
cation No 22678/93, Incal v Turkey ECHR 1998-IV para 46; Application No 26958/95, Jerusalem v
Austria ECHR 2001-II, para 36; Application No 33629/06, Vajnai v Hungary (unreported) 8 July 2008,
para 51; Application No 37374/05, Társágág A Szabadságjogokért v Hungary (unreported) 14 April 2009,
para 26.
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compelling and inescapable reasons to do so;224 and that it requires convincing argu-
ments to justify limitations on meetings of associations or demonstrations.225 Con-
versely, the ECtHR often leaves a wider margin of appreciation if only the periphery of
the freedom of speech has been affected. It has held, for example, that the sensation
press hardly ever contributes to a debate of general interest, since it publishes mainly
gossip and human interest articles featuring people’s private lives.226 The court in this
context generally leaves the national authorities much latitude to restrict the freedom of
expression to protect the right to reputation or the right to privacy. Likewise, the court
does not apply intensive scrutiny to restrictions of commercial expressions (such as
television or radio commercials), except when such expressions are really political in
character or contribute to a debate about a topic of general interest.227
In the same line, the ECtHR has devised a ‘core’ for a number of rights that are not
so much closely related to democracy, as well as to the concepts of personal autonomy
and human dignity. Article 8 of the convention (family life, private life and housing),
has been given a very wide scope in the court’s case-law—the provision covers issues as
divergent as the right to assisted suicide to the right to be protected against environ-
mental pollution.228 Within this wide range of rights, the court has distinguished a
(rather fuzzy) core of rights that are really considered of essential importance to the
individual. In general, the court has held that measures that affect ‘the most intimate’
or ‘sensitive’ aspects of someone’s life, such as someone’s sexuality229 or identity,230
should generally be carefully scrutinised for their reasonableness and objectivity.231 By
contrast, the ECtHR has held that general policy measures affecting individual inter-
ests that are not closely connected to the core of the right to private or family life can
be reviewed much more marginally.
224 eg Application No 19392/92, United Communist Party of Turkey v Turkey ECHR 1998-I, para 57; see also
Application No 41340/98, Refah Partisi and Others v Turkey ECHR 2003-II, para 86.
225 eg Application No 74989/01, Ouranio Toxo and Others v Greece ECHR 2005-X, para 36; Application
No 35082/04, Makhmudov v Russia (unreported) 26 July 2007 para 63. See also H. Fenwick, ‘The Right
to Protest, the Human Rights Act and the Margin of Appreciation’, (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 491,
at 492.
226 Application No 59320/00, Von Hannover v Germany ECHR 2004-VI, paras 65–66. See also Application
Nos 66910/02 and 71612/01, Société Prisma Presse v France (unreported) 1 July 2003 (decision) and, more
recently, Application No 12268/03, Hachette Filipacchi Associés (‘Ici Paris’) v France (unreported) 23
July 2009, para 40.
227 See, eg, Application No 10572/83, markt intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v Germany Series A
No 165, para 33; Application No 38743/97, Demuth v Switzerland ECHR 2002-IX; Application
No 44179/98, Murphy v Ireland ECHR 2003-IX, para 67. For examples of intensified review of restrictions
of commercial speech in a political context, see Application No 25181/94, Hertel v Switzerland ECHR
1998-VI, para 47; Application No 24699/94, VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland ECHR 2001-VI,
paras 69–72. See elaborately on this M. Hertig Randall, ‘Commercial Speech under the European
Convention on Human Rights: Subordinate or Equal?’, (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 53, at 74 ff.
228 On this, see, eg, J.H. Gerards, ‘Fundamental Rights and Other Interests—Should it Really Make a
Difference?,’ in E. Brems (ed), Conflicts between Fundamental Rights (Intersentia, 2008), 655, at 659 ff.
229 See in particular Application No 7525/76, Dudgeon v UK Series A No 45, para 52; Application Nos
33985/96, 33986/96, Smith and Grady v UK ECHR 1999-VI, para 89; Application Nos 42758/98 and
45558/99, KA and AD v Belgium (unreported) 17 February 2005; Application No 29002/06, Schlumpf v
Switzerland (unreported) 8 January 2009, para 104.
230 eg Application No 58757/00, Jäggi v Switzerland ECHR 2006-X, para 37.
231 Such core rights may still be of very different sorts, varying from the prohibition on unwarranted
disclosure of medical information (eg Application No 22009/93, Z v Finland ECHR 1997-I, paras 95–96)
to the right to live in one’s own house (eg Application No 9063/80, Gillow v UK Series A No 109, para 55).
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D Conclusion and Criticism
The previous discussion of the various factors determining the scope of the margin of
appreciation may serve to illustrate that the margin of appreciation case-law of the
ECtHR is more refined and detailed than the case-law of the EU courts. The ECtHR
has developed a relatively clear doctrine that is consistent with its views on its role as a
supranational court and with the objectives of the convention. In line with its theoreti-
cal underpinnings, the ECtHR distinguishes different factors that may influence the
scope of the margin. Overall, it can be said that the ECtHR thereby uses the possibili-
ties of variation in the intensity of its review to its advantage, especially by expressly
determining the margin of appreciation in each and every individual case on the basis
of a rather clear set of intensity-determining factors.232 Its flexibility makes the doctrine
very attractive as an instrument to negotiate between the court’s task to protect human
rights as effectively as possible, and its need to respect national sovereignty and make
its judgments acceptable for national authorities. Since the court has really applied the
doctrine in every case under review, it also has had the opportunity to use it to enhance
the predictability and clarity of its approach. It is well known to all Member States, for
example, that the ECtHR will very strictly scrutinise limitations to press freedom if the
relevant expression concerns a subject of general interest, whereas the national authori-
ties will also be aware that there is more room for manoeuvre if the expression relates
to morals or other subjects on which opinions in the Member States may reasonably
differ. Especially in a complex and pluralist world, such clarity about the extent of the
latitude that is left to the national level is extremely valuable.
This is not to say, however, that the ECtHR’s application of the doctrine should be
uncritically adopted as a standard for all supranational courts. As mentioned in section
IVB, the court does not consistently apply the doctrine as an instrument to determine
the intensity of its review of national measures and decisions. Another important
setback is that it has omitted to provide much clarity as to the inter-relationship of the
various intensity-determining factors.233 There does not seem to be a single standard
that helps the court decide if intensity-determining factors pull in different directions.
If a measure severely impedes an important right, in an context where there is no
common ground, the intensity-determining factors do not indicate an inevitable answer
to the question what margin of appreciation would be called for (although the court
often applies ‘intermediate scrutiny’ in this kind of case).234 Problems may also arise if
an important right is interfered with in an area in which the national authorities are
clearly better placed than the court is to assess the necessity of restrictive measures.235
232 There are some examples of cases in which the doctrine is not mentioned at all (eg Application
No 31675/04, Codarcea v Romania (unreported) 2 June 2009; Application No 36936/05, Szuluk v UK
(unreported) 2 June 2009). The reasons for this are not clear.
233 See also M.R. Hutchinson, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human
Rights’, (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 641.
234 This situation occurred in Application No 21132/05, TV Vest AS & Rogaland Pensjonistparti v Norway
(unreported) 11 December 2008. In other cases, the court just left ‘a certain margin of appreciation’.
Although it did not make particularly clear what this means, it can be imagined that this indicates some
form of heightened scrutiny; see, eg, Application No 13470/87, Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria Series A
No 295-A, para 50; Application No 69698/01, Stoll v Switzerland ECHR 2007-XIV, paras 106–107.
235 For examples of this, see Application No 2346/02, Pretty v UK ECHR 2002-III; Application No 52562/99,
52620/99, Sørensen and Rasmussen v Denmark (unreported) 11 January 2006, para 58 (strict scrutiny
because of the importance of the right at stake, regardless of the lack of consensus and the better placed
argument); Application No 54934/00, Weber and Seravia v Germany (unreported) 29 June 2006, para 106
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The ECtHR tends to solve such dilemma’s by simply stopping short of making a real
choice.236 It often contents itself by mentioning a number of relevant factors (sometimes
even expressly noting the conflict), and it then continues to examine the case without
providing any clarity as to the scope of the margin of appreciation and the applicable
level of intensity.237 This is problematic, since it is precisely in these cases of conflicting
factors that it is important to know about the proper intensity of review. Indeed, no
doctrine of deference is really useful without a standard that can help to choose
between conflicting intensity-determining factors. Although the comparison with the
ECtHR’s doctrine can be helpful to identify the possibilities of a real ‘doctrine of
deference’, the development of a workable doctrine of deference for the ECJ therefore
really requires an additional step to be taken, namely the development of such a
standard. That is what the final section of this article will endeavour to do.
V Conclusion—Developing a ‘Doctrine of Deference’ for the EU Courts
Variation in the intensity of review by supranational courts such as the EU courts
and the ECtHR can be extremely valuable in helping these courts to deal with the
problems posed by a pluralist legal order. The ‘judicial dialectics’ in a pluralist legal
order demand careful and respectful cooperation between national and supranational
courts and other powers of government. As explained in section II, such voluntary
cooperation may be facilitated and enhanced in a variety of ways, but in particular
by systematic use of the possibilities of ‘deference’. In normal circumstances, supra-
national courts must accept that the national authorities (legislative, administrative
and judicial) are best equipped and legitimised to draft legislation, take decisions and
pronounce judgments, since they are best acquainted with the national circumstances,
debates and sensitivities. For that reason, judicial review on the supranational level
should start from a position of deference. Supranational courts should limit
themselves to examining if the national institutions have acted in a manifestly
(‘fairly wide margin of appreciation’ in a case on secret surveillance in the interest of national security);
Application No 15948/03, Soulas and Others v France (unreported) 10 July 2008, para 38 (in which the
ECtHR finally settled on an intermediate level of review (‘une marge d’appréciation assez large’)).
236 eg Application No 2346/02, Pretty v UK ECHR 2002-III, para 71, in which the court mentioned that, even
though the case concerned a very important right, there were reasons to adopt a different approach. It did
not, however, explain what these reasons were and how large the resulting margin of appreciation should
be. Even some of the judges of the ECtHR have shown themselves critical about this aspect of the
application of the doctrine. For example, in the case of Application No 34438/04, Egeland and Hanseid v
Norway (unreported) 16 April 2009, dissenting Judge Malinverni stated that it is essential that the
case-law of the court establish clear, objective and specific criteria that make it possible to determine in
which scenarios the court must show self-restraint (dissenting opinion Judge Malinverni, para 4). Vice-
President of the Court Rozakis in his dissenting opinion to the case criticised the majority for having
applied the doctrine with an unwarranted level of automaticity, stating that ‘[o]ne can really wonder,
when reading . . . the judgment, what is really left to the margin of appreciation invoked by the Court,
and how different the judgment would have been if no reference to the concept had been made’ (dissenting
opinion Judge Rozakis, para c).
237 An important example is the case of Application No 36022/97, Hatton v United Kingdom ECHR 2003-
VIII, a case about sleep disturbance caused by night flights at Heathrow Airport. Although a large part
of the judgment was devoted to identifying the relevant intensity-determining factors, the court did not
reach a conclusive judgment on the issue (compare paras 101 and 129). For similar examples, see
Application No 2346/02, Pretty v UK ECHR 2002-III; Application No 23960/02, Zeman v Austria
(unreported) 29 June 2006, para 33; Application No 19009/04, McCann v UK (unreported) 13 May 2008;
Application No 36919/02, Armoniène v Lithuania (unreported) 25 November 2008, paras 38 ff.
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unreasonable or arbitrary manner, and they should be reluctant to substitute the
national views with their own. By showing deference, or by leaving a wide margin of
appreciation, the European courts can confirm their respect for national procedures
and decisions. In turn, such articulated supranational respect may enhance the com-
pliance of national authorities with European judgments, since it is then evident
that national values and choices will only be interfered with if there is good reason to
do so.
In section II it has also been explained that there may sometimes be good reason for
a supranational court to intensify its review of national measures or decisions. Indeed,
it appears from the analyses provided in the previous sections that such intensification
is clearly visible in the supranational courts’ case-law. The ECtHR often allows
national authorities a wide margin of appreciation, which results in quite relaxed
judicial scrutiny, but, in the end, it considers that it is its own task to guarantee the
objectives of the convention in an effective manner. If core rights have been affected or
if convention rights have been seriously impaired, the ECtHR will examine the facts
and arguments advanced in favour of certain restrictions and limitations more closely.
In similar vein, the ECJ appears to apply stricter scrutiny in those cases in which
national measures or decisions are at stake that impede the realisation of the central
objectives of the EU treaty, such as the realisation of an internal market or the free
movement of goods, services, workers or capital.
Thus, variation in the intensity of review already seems to be an accepted and
well-used judicial instrument for the European supranational courts. Nevertheless, it
can be argued that the instrument can be used far more effectively, especially by the EU
courts (but also by the ECtHR). As analysed in section III, the EU courts do indeed
appear to vary the intensity of their review, but their case-law hardly discloses a
systematic and structured approach towards the instrument of deference. Different
from the ECtHR, the ECJ nor the General Court have elaborated a single doctrine
underlying their use of deference or marginal review. The EU courts often mention
elements of marginal review or give some general reasons for the application of mar-
ginal or intensive review, but they tend to do so in highly formulaic considerations that
hardly seem to have any substantive content. In addition, in cases where terms and
notions of deference are used, the real standards of review frequently seem to disclose
a quite intensive test, or the other way around. In the end, the EU courts’ case-law
leaves its observer with the impression of a rather haphazard application of the notion
of deference.
For the case-law of the ECtHR this is somewhat different. The ECtHR has devel-
oped its margin of appreciation doctrine at an early stage and it has clearly explained
its theoretical foundations. It has made out that a margin of appreciation should be left
to the states since the national authorities are usually better placed than the interna-
tional judge to assess the necessity and suitability of certain measures and policies, and
since national opinions on the protection of certain values and rights may reasonably
vary. On the other hand, the ECtHR has held that it is just as capable as national courts
to give judgment on the interpretation of the convention and it has stated that it takes
its task to protect the core values of the convention very seriously. Even more impor-
tantly, the court reiterates the doctrine and its background in almost every case placed
before it and it commonly explains the reasons why the various factors result in a
particular scope of the margin of appreciation in each individual case. As has been
argued in section IV, this makes the doctrine into a very flexible tool that may moreover
provide useful information to the national authorities as to their room for manoeuvre.
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As a judicial instrument to negotiate with problems of pluralism, it is therefore very
attractive indeed.
The margin of appreciation doctrine as developed by the ECtHR may constitute an
important example for the EU courts. There is no good reason why these courts
should not develop their own ‘doctrine of deference’ to be consistently and system-
atically applied in all cases before them. Such a doctrine of deference may find its
basis in the arguments and reasons expounded in section II and shortly summarised
above. Ideally, the doctrine of deference should involve a choice between three dif-
ferent levels of intensity of judicial review. The EU courts should distinguish between
marginal review, strict scrutiny and intermediate review. These levels of review should
be translated in clear substantive standards of review and in clear requirements as to
the apportionment of the burden of proof. Such standards and requirements may
differ for the various types of cases to be reviewed, but for each of these issues some
basic criteria might easily be thought of. For cases about the general principle of
proportionality, for example, it has already been mentioned that the burden to dem-
onstrate the necessity and suitability of certain measures might be placed with the
defendant institutions if a strict test is applied, whereas marginal review might imply
that the applicant shows persuasive evidence to the effect that the measure is clearly
superfluous or ineffective.
Just as importantly, the EU courts’ doctrine of deference should include a number of
factors that can be used to determine the appropriate level of review. It has been
concluded in sections III and IV that both the EU courts’ case-law and the case-law of
the ECtHR already disclose a variety of relevant examples. Though formulated differ-
ently, the factors applied by the EU courts and the ECtHR appear to be highly similar.
The ECtHR as well as the EU courts accept that clear and serious impairment of the
central objectives of either the convention or the EC and EU treaties constitutes a
convincing argument to intensify judicial review. In addition, all European courts have
found that there is good reason to show deference if a case concerns issues of socio-
economic policy which demands complex assessments of fact to be made, or if a case
concerns moral or ethical issues on which the opinions within the various states may
reasonably differ. In addition, though related, the EU courts attach much weight to the
extent of the discretionary powers of the competent authority or institution (a factor
that the ECtHR does not appear to pay real attention to)—if discretionary powers are
wide, the EU courts usually find that marginal review is in place.
All of these factors may indeed be relevant to determine the proper intensity of
review. More problematic is the question how the EU courts should decide on the
appropriate level of review in cases in which intensity-determining factors are pulling
in different directions. Controversies may arise, for example, if national measures
intended to protect important constitutional values or complex socio-economic inter-
ests (such as the right to life or central aspects of the social security system) seriously
hamper fundamental interests (such as the right to personal autonomy or the right to
property). Should the EU courts in these cases exercise restraint, or should they be
willing to apply strict judicial review? Unfortunately, the present case-law of both the
Strasbourg and the Luxembourg courts does not disclose a single standard or crite-
rion to select the proper level of review in such cases. All courts seem to be inclined
to avoid a clear approach or answer in these cases, often limiting themselves to stating
that some conflicting factors are present. This is unsatisfactory, especially since it
is precisely in these cases that clarity and predictability of the supranational approach
is desirable.
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A way out of this quandary can be found by looking for inspiration in classical
theories of procedural democracy.238 According to these theories, important decisions
requiring value judgments or specific expertise should normally be made by the legis-
lature and the executive, given their democratic legitimacy and their instruments and
equipment to assess and balance social, economic and political interests.239 Arguably,
both national and European legislative and administrative procedures are designed to
optimise the quality and legitimacy of decision making and they contain important
systems of checks and balances. Even if decisions are taken that appear to be wrong or
undesirable, a variety of mechanisms is available in every well-functioning democratic
system to repair them.240 This means that courts should normally be reluctant to
intervene, even if the outcomes of the decision-making process seem misconceived or
undesirable.
At the same time, it must be recalled here that the picture of the legitimacy and
quality of legislative and administrative procedures and their self-corrective force is
highly idealistically coloured. Many questions are possible as to the ability of the
legislature and the executive to ‘reach the right answer’,241 while even more doubts
may exist as to the actual democratic legitimacy of legislatures and (especially) the
administration. In particular in the context of the EU, complaints about the ‘demo-
cratic deficit’ are difficult to reconcile with the general starting point of judicial reli-
ance on the quality and legitimacy of democratic decision making. It is precisely for
that reason that judicial control of legislation and administrative decisions is consid-
ered valuable.
According to procedural democracy doctrine, an all-important criterion to decide on
the reasonableness of intrusive judicial control is whether the legislative or administra-
tive procedure really can be suspected to be defective to the extent that even its own
corrective mechanisms cannot be trusted any more and to the extent that the quality
and legitimacy of the outcomes of the process must be doubted.242 In his well-known
book Democracy and Distrust, John Hart Ely has indicated a number of signs that may
raise the suspicion of problematic flaws in the normal decision-making procedures.243 If
such signs are present, and if they really raise the suspicion that the decision-making
procedures might be corrupt or defect, there is reason for intensive judicial review.
The first indication of malfunction is that core elements of the process itself are
neglected or misapplied. If fundamental constitutional values and rights such as elec-
toral rights or the freedom of expression are impaired by certain measures or decisions,
this may negatively affect the functioning of the procedural system as a whole.244 Such
measures or decisions should be scrutinised for their reasonableness with great care.
The second indication for distrust is offered by the outcomes of a decision-making
process. If the rights or interests of specific groups are systematically prejudiced, it is
probable that there is a defect in the procedure that makes it rather easy for the
legislature to neglect these interests or to attach insufficient value to them.245
238 In particular Ely, op cit n 37 supra; see also J. Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’,
(2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346, at 1386 ff.
239 cf Young, op cit n 35 supra, at 566; see also Rivers, op cit n 47 supra, at 199; Waldron, ibid, at 1386–1387.
240 cf Tushnet, op cit n 41 supra, at 31; Waldron, ibid, at 1361–1362 and 1388.
241 cf Young, op cit n 35 supra, at 570.
242 For a somewhat comparable approach, see Young, op cit n 35 supra, at 564.
243 Ely, op cit n 37 supra).
244 ibid, at 103 and ch 5.
245 ibid, at 103 and ch 6.
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It certainly seems possible to adapt this theory to the situation of the European
courts so as to provide them with some guidance as to the determination of their
level of review. In particular, Ely’s two main indications should be supplemented
with an indication concerning fundamental individual rights such as human dignity
or personal autonomy and core constitutional objectives. The procedural theory does
not state that careful judicial attention is warranted if such interests or objectives are
harmed. Building on the theory, however, it may be submitted that (serious) inter-
ferences with such essential rights and objectives may also raise a suspicion of flaws
or defects in the decision-making process.246 After all, in such cases it may be
assumed at the least that certain fundamental interests have not been given sufficient
weight in the decision-making process. In those cases, there may be good reason for
careful judicial scrutiny.247 The same can be said if a measure or decision has been
taken that clearly violates one of the central objectives underlying the relevant legal
order.248 For the EU courts this means that intensification of review is justifiable if a
measure affects the fundamental freedoms or if it runs counter to the interests of a
free internal market.
Building on this theory, the general approach to be taken by the EU courts could be
the application of a marginal test. Only if there is objective reason to suspect that the
decision-making process was taunted by essential flaws and defects, the test may be
intensified to strict scrutiny. Such objective reasons present themselves in the shape of
a clear interference with fundamental individual or procedural rights, or in the shape of
a violation of fundamental Community interests, which are factors that are already
taken into account by the EU courts at present.
Other factors that are often mentioned by the EU courts seem to be of less
relevance from this perspective. Neither the scope of the discretionary powers
of a legislative or administrative body, nor the factor relating to the need to
make complex socio-economic assessments is really pertinent to determining the
intensity of review, since deference is already considered to be the rule, rather than
the exception.
Nevertheless, the ‘better placed’ argument, the argument of discretionary powers and
the argument of consensus may still be of some importance. Even if a case in principle
calls for careful judicial scrutiny because of the objective presence of intensity-
increasing factors, there may be reasons why the supranational court is less well
equipped to take the assignment. If a case concerns sensitive moral or ethical issues on
which opinions may well differ; if a case is closely related to national constitutional
values; or if a case is difficult to decide since it requires highly technical or scientific
assessments to be made, some degree of deference is almost unavoidable—especially if
the measures are taken in the exercise of (wide) discretionary powers. It is in these cases
that the intermediate level of review can be used, which may be regarded as a ‘second
look’ approach. Intermediate review requires the validity and trustworthiness of the
national decision-making process to be tested on a procedural plane, and on a sub-
stantive plane it may be a bit more demanding than a purely marginal test in terms of
the required quality and convincingness of the arguments underlying the decision. It
must be admitted that it will not be easy to draft such intermediate tests, but their
246 cf Rivers, op cit n 47 supra, at 205.
247 ibid.
248 ibid.
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development is greatly to be preferred over the present situation in which simply no
answer at all is provided to the question as to the proper level of review in these ‘in
between’ cases.
In conclusion, it may be said that the EU courts (as well as the ECtHR) could greatly
improve their use of the possibilities of the instrument of deference by expressly
referring to a doctrine of deference. If such is done along the lines drawn above, it is to
be expected that the doctrine can be used well in dealing with the complex position of
a supranational court in a pluralist European legal order. To meet the current and
future challenges that seem to lie ahead of the EU courts, this is certainly no luxury.
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